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Hundreds of thousands of consumer debtors pass through the bank-
ruptcy process each year.1  Although these cases are legally complex, the 
bankruptcy system handles them in a routinized manner.2  This streamlined 
process allows consumer debtors to obtain a discharge of their debts at rela-
tively low financial cost,3 yet the system leaves open avenues for abuse.  
Repeat players can take advantage of the bankruptcy process—its com-
plexity, the limited savvy of many debtors, and the likelihood that small-
scale misbehavior will go unnoticed or unaddressed—to extract undue ben-
efits.4 
In November 2014, for example, national news media reported allega-
tions that large national lenders, including JPMorgan Chase, Bank of Amer-
                                                          
 1.  See NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY RESEARCH CENTER, https://www.nbkrc.com (last visited 
Aug. 24, 2015) (aggregating bankruptcy filing data); AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE, Bank-
ruptcy Statistics, http://www.abi.org/newsroom/bankruptcy-statistics (last visited Aug. 24, 2015). 
 2.  See, e.g., HENRY J. SOMMER ET AL., CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 81 
(John Rao ed., 8th ed. 2006) (“Once it has been decided that bankruptcy is appropriate in a partic-
ular case, most of the remaining work is relatively routine.  A good deal of it involves preparation 
of the necessary papers for the initial filing . . . .”).  But see Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Bank-
ruptcy Fee Study: Final Report, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 17, 121–22 (2012) (noting that, 
especially after enactment of the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act, “there are ever fewer seemingly simple cases”).  
 3.  William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as Con-
sumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397, 
406 (1994) (“Routine, uncontested cases allow [consumer bankruptcy attorneys] to charge low 
fees, which in turn makes it easier to attract a sufficiently large clientele to justify investment in 
routinized procedures.”). 
 4.  See generally Kara Bruce, The Debtor Class, 88 TUL. L. REV. 21, 25–42 (2013) (describ-
ing the gap between bankruptcy’s requirements and creditor action in consumer bankruptcy cas-
es).  
 2016] VINDICATING BANKRUPTCY RIGHTS 445 
ica, and Citigroup, refused to remove debt that had been discharged in 
bankruptcy from borrowers’ credit reports.5  This tactic is believed to pres-
sure borrowers into repaying debts they no longer owe.6  Six years earlier, 
Katherine Porter brought to light pervasive problems in proofs of claim 
filed by mortgage lenders and servicers.7  Her study of 1744 chapter 13 
bankruptcy cases revealed rampant errors in bankruptcy mortgage claims, 
most of which negatively affected debtors or competing creditors, and near-
ly all of which passed through the bankruptcy process unchecked.8  In the 
late 1990s, the Sears Corporation faced criminal liability and the largest fi-
ne ever assessed for bankruptcy fraud, based on a widespread program to 
collect debt using unenforceable reaffirmation agreements.9  This type of 
behavior has affected thousands of debtors in bankruptcy.10  It not only vio-
lates federal law and bankruptcy court orders, but also undermines the fun-
damental goals of consumer bankruptcy: treating creditors fairly and 
providing debtors a fresh financial start.11 
This Article is part of the first comprehensive study examining the use 
of class action adversary proceedings12 to curb systematic overreaching by 
creditors in bankruptcy.13  Class actions have long been promoted as a solu-
tion to the problem of small value consumer claims, as they permit litigants 
to bring claims that are uneconomical to litigate on an individual basis.14  
These actions not only compensate individuals for harm suffered, but also 
                                                          
 5.  Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Debts Canceled by Bankruptcy Still Mar Consumer Credit 
Scores, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 12, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/debts-canceled-by-
bankruptcy-still-mar-consumer-credit-scores/.  More recently, The New York Times reported that 
Bank of America has sought credit under a settlement with the Justice Department for forgiving 
mortgage loans that were no longer owed because they had already been eliminated by the bank-
ruptcy discharge.  See Gretchen Morgenson, Bank of America’s Relief for Mortgage Borrowers Is 
Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, (May 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/10/business/bank-of-
americas-relief-for-mortgage-borrowers-is-questioned.html?_r=0 .  
 6.  Silver-Greenberg, supra note 5.  
 7.  Katherine Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims, 87 TEX. L. 
REV. 121 (2008). 
 8.  See id. at 144–63.  
 9.  See Bruce, supra note 4, at 28–29 (describing the Sears Corporation’s reaffirmation prac-
tices and the criminal liability and penalties that resulted); Barnaby J. Feder, The Harder Side of 
Sears, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/20/business/the-harder-side-
of-sears.html (same). 
 10.  See Bruce, supra note 4, at 25–30 (collecting examples).  
 11.  See id. at 31–32 (discussing consumer bankruptcy’s goals); Margaret Howard, A Theory 
of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047, 1047 (1987) (describing the fresh-
start policy of consumer bankruptcy). 
 12.  Adversary proceedings are civil actions brought in connection with a bankruptcy case.  
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001; 10-7001 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 7001.01.  I refer to class action 
adversary proceedings brought by debtor classes as “debtor class actions” throughout this Article. 
 13.  The first article in this series, The Debtor Class, considered threshold jurisdictional con-
cerns that have troubled courts and perhaps deterred debtors from pursuing aggregate claims in 
bankruptcy.  See Bruce, supra note 4. 
 14.  Id. at 40 (collecting authority).  
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force defendants to internalize some of the costs of their misconduct.15  In 
this way, class actions can serve as a valuable complement to bankruptcy’s 
broader regulatory efforts.16  Class actions also increase transparency, pre-
serve judicial resources, and encourage uniformity and consistency in the 
application of law.17  Moreover, bankruptcy courts are well-suited to handle 
debtor class actions, based on their institutional capacity for handling ag-
gregate claims and addressing consumer protection’s goals.18 
Nevertheless, the class action has steadily lost traction in the civil jus-
tice system.  In a series of recent cases, the Supreme Court has bolstered 
businesses’ ability to limit their exposure to class litigation through class 
action waivers contained in consumer arbitration agreements.19  In particu-
lar, the Supreme Court has rejected two equitable challenges to class arbi-
tration waivers,20 indicating that the strong federal policies underlying the 
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) “trump[] any interest in ensuring the pros-
ecution of low-value claims.”21  In another series of cases, the Supreme 
Court and lower federal courts have heightened the requirements of class 
certification, limiting the window of cases that can be brought on a class-
wide basis.22 
This Article clarifies a path for debtor class actions in the modern, an-
ti-class action framework.  First, no matter how powerful class arbitration 
waivers may be outside of bankruptcy, courts have broad discretion to pro-
hibit bankruptcy claims from being resolved in arbitration if arbitration 
would create an inherent conflict with bankruptcy law or necessarily jeop-
                                                          
 15.  See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“A class action . . . 
aggregat[es] the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an 
attorney’s) labor.” (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (1997)).  Absent 
such aggregation, “defendant firms are in a position to spread the litigation costs over the entire 
class of . . . claims, while plaintiffs . . . can not . . . .” David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass 
Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 564 (1987); see also In re 
Am. Reserve Corp., 840 F.2d 487, 489 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he class action provides compensation 
that cannot be achieved in any other way; although the costs of litigation may consume much of 
the benefit, the device still serves a deterrent function by ensuring that wrongdoers bear the costs 
of their activities.”). 
 16.  See Bruce, supra note 4, at 40 (discussing the regulatory benefits of private litigation).  
For a brief discussion and response to predominant critiques of class actions, see id. at 40–42. 
 17.  See id. 
 18.  See infra text accompanying notes 47–50. 
 19.  See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309–10 (2013) (rejecting 
“effective vindication of statutory rights” challenge to class arbitration waivers); AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding unconscionability challenge to class arbitra-
tion waiver was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Ani-
malFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 687 (2010) (holding arbitration clause that was silent on the 
issue of class arbitration could not be construed to permit class arbitration). 
 20.  I use the term “class arbitration waivers” to describe any waivers of class action rights 
that appear in an arbitration agreement. 
 21.  Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2312 n.5.  
 22.  See infra Part IV. 
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ardize the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code.23  As a descriptive matter, ar-
bitration of many debtor class action proceedings will likely present an in-
herent conflict with the Bankruptcy Code.24  As a normative matter, courts 
should consider class-killing arbitration clauses as probative evidence of an 
inherent conflict whenever the clause would preclude debtor classes from 
effectively vindicating their bankruptcy rights.25  Second, although the re-
quirements for class certification are rigorous, some of the most troubling 
debtor class action cases are prime candidates for certification.26 
To be sure, the window of debtor class action cases that can survive 
these modern challenges is narrow.  Nevertheless, in light of the regulatory 
benefits of class actions, debtors’ attorneys, case trustees, and courts should 
embrace debtor classes to the extent permissible under applicable law.  In 
addition, scholars and lawmakers should consider ways to encourage great-
er levels of compliance with applicable bankruptcy law and procedure, 
whether by reviving aspects of the class device or advancing non-class 
methods of private litigation.27 
Part II begins by describing debtor class actions and the challenges 
they face.  It then focuses on the rise of class action waivers in consumer 
arbitration agreements, the Supreme Court’s embrace of these waivers, and 
the impact this case law has on small value claims.28  Part III places these 
developments in the context of a debtor class action proceeding, arguing 
that courts can, through application of the “inherent conflict” test, preserve 
debtor class actions in the face of a class arbitration waiver.29  In Part IV, 
this Article argues that modern class certification standards do not com-
pletely foreclose debtor class action relief.30  This Article concludes by ob-
serving that class actions can serve as a valuable component of consumer 
bankruptcy’s regulatory structure, and looks forward to additional reforms 
to encourage compliance with consumer bankruptcy law.31 
                                                          
 23.  See infra Part III.B. 
 24.  See infra Part III.C.  
 25.  See infra Part III.D.  
 26.  See infra Part IV.  
 27.  A subsequent article discusses additional options to address lender noncompliance in 
bankruptcy.  See Kara Bruce, Closing Consumer Bankruptcy’s Enforcement Gap, forthcoming 
(2016). 
 28.  See infra Part II. 
 29.  See infra Part III.A–D. 
 30.  See infra Part IV. 
 31.  See infra Part V. 
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I.  DEBTOR CLASS ACTIONS AND THE CHALLENGES THEY FACE 
A.  Debtor Class Actions 
This series of articles seeks to address a rift between the norms of 
bankruptcy law and the realities of bankruptcy practice.  As noted above, 
large institutional lenders—some with thousands of borrowers in bankrupt-
cy—may routinely fail to comply with consumer bankruptcy law and pro-
cedure.32  The alarming prevalence of this behavior came to the fore in the 
wake of the Great Recession, along with the “robo-signing” scandal that 
exposed similar misconduct in mortgage foreclosure cases.33  Yet high pro-
file examples preceding and following the foreclosure crisis indicate that 
this problem is not limited to mortgage lenders and servicers and likewise 
has not been resolved.34 
Some cases of lender noncompliance in bankruptcy arise from under-
staffing, institutional sloppiness, or the use of bookkeeping software that is 
not designed to accommodate the bankruptcy process.35  Others suggest a 
more calculated departure from the requirements of bankruptcy law and 
procedure.36  Whatever their origin, the actions or inactions of creditors in 
bankruptcy can disadvantage competing claimants to the debtor’s limited 
pool of assets, or may jeopardize the debtor’s pursuit of a fresh start.37  
Moreover, although some of these issues have been highly publicized and 
have resulted in enforcement38 and law reform39 efforts, lender noncompli-
ance persists.40 
                                                          
 32.  See supra notes 5–9 and accompanying text; Bruce, supra note 4, at 25–30 (collecting 
additional examples).  
 33.  See Bruce, supra note 4, at 25–28 (describing pervasive under-compliance with bank-
ruptcy and foreclosure law by mortgage lenders and servicers).  
 34.  See supra note 5 (highlighting recent examples); Bruce, supra note 4, at 28–30 (high-
lighting examples not related to the Great Recession).  
 35.  See, e.g., Bruce, supra note 4, at 28; Alan M. White, Losing the Paper—Mortgage As-
signments, Note Transfers and Consumer Protection, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 468, 469–70 
(2012) (describing mortgage lenders’ documentation shortcuts, such as “assembly-line signing and 
notarizing of affidavits for foreclosure cases, mortgage assignments, note allonges and related 
documents” known generally as “robo-signing”). 
 36.  See, e.g., In re Stewart, 391 B.R. 327, 355–57 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2008) (sanctioning mort-
gage servicer for inflating proofs of claim with fees for excessive drive-by property inspections, 
inspections on property other than the debtor’s, and two broker price opinions that were allegedly 
conducted when the property was inaccessible to civilians in the wake of Hurricane Katrina).  
 37.  See Bruce, supra note 4, at 34. 
 38.  See id. at 35 (discussing efforts by the U.S. Trustee Program, federal and state agencies, 
and individual bankruptcy judges to address such abuse). 
 39.  See, e.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001 (amending the proof-of-claim filing rules to require, 
among other things, an itemization of interest, fees, expenses, and other charges claimed, as well 
as the amount necessary to cure a default and, if the lien is on the debtor’s principal residence, 
provide an escrow statement as of the petition date); id. at 3002.1 (requiring holders of mortgage 
claims to provide notice before a change in the amount of mortgage payments, as well as notices 
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In the first article in this series, The Debtor Class, I explored the use of 
class action adversary proceedings as a complement to bankruptcy’s regula-
tory structure and an added check on lender conduct.41  As other scholars 
have observed, the evidence of sloppiness and overreaching in the bank-
ruptcy arena suggests that large consumer lenders may lack sufficient incen-
tives to comply with bankruptcy law and procedure in consumer bankruptcy 
cases.42  Consumer bankruptcy features numerous layers of protection from 
abuse—including the presence of a case trustee, the oversight of a United 
States Trustee Program, and the bankruptcy courts’ statutory and inherent 
powers to address wrongdoing43—but each of these entities is poorly posi-
tioned to discover small but pervasive incidences of lender misconduct.44  
Moreover, even if a debtor or her attorney discovers the abuse, it might not 
be economically feasible to challenge the practices.45  A robust threat of 
class actions may provide a deterrent stopgap at a lower institutional cost, 
fill in the gaps that remain from existing enforcement efforts, and deter fu-
ture wrongful conduct.46 
In many ways, bankruptcy is an ideal forum for consumer class actions 
to flourish.  First, the bankruptcy system has a long history of furthering the 
goals of consumer financial protection.  William Whitford has argued that 
                                                          
of the fees, expenses, or charges incurred post-petition that the claimant asserts are recoverable 
from the debtor). 
 40.  To date, the national mortgage settlement is the most significant enforcement effort of 
bankruptcy misconduct.  See About the Settlement, JOINT STATE-FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE 
SETTLEMENTS, http://www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com/about (last visited Aug. 24, 2015).  
Yet it has become increasingly clear that violations of bankruptcy law remain, and the mortgage 
lenders and servicers subject to the settlement have not followed it to the letter.  See Danielle 
Douglas, Some Big Banks Are Still Violating the National Mortgage Settlement, Report Says, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/some-big-banks-
are-still-violating-the-national-mortgage-settlement-report-says/2013/12/04/02b4091a-5d1b-11e3-
95c2-13623eb2b0e1_story.html; Bruce, supra note 4, at 35 (cataloguing early evidence of non-
compliance with new Bankruptcy Rules).  Moreover, reports of lenders’ failure to clean credit re-
ports and other foreclosure practices suggest that these problems will continue.  See Silver-
Greenberg, supra note 5; Gretchen Morgenson, Borrowers, Beware: The Robo-Signers Aren’t 
Finished Yet, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 15, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1uwZU34.  
 41.  Bruce, supra note 4, at 34–42. 
 42.  See id. at 23; see also Porter, supra note 7, at 171 (“[T]he current system suggests that 
creditors can operate with the knowledge that their claims will not be reviewed or challenged.”).  
 43.  Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1194 (2014) (discussing bankruptcy courts’ statutory and 
inherent powers). 
 44.  See Bruce, supra note 4, at 37 (highlighting the limitations of many current methods to 
combat lender misconduct); Anne E. Wells, Not in My House: Combating Unethical Mortgage 
Lender Practices and Related Attorney Misconduct in the Bankruptcy Courts, 32 CAL. BANKR. J. 
483, 509 (2013) (same).  
 45.  See Bruce, supra note 4, at 37; see also In re Henry, 311 B.R. 813, 816 (Bankr. W.D. 
Wash. 2004) (“[B]ecause the cost of pursuing an objection frequently exceeds the distribution the 
claim will receive under the plan, [debtors] are forced by the economics of the process just to pay 
the claim even if they have valid defenses to it.”). 
 46.  Bruce, supra note 4, at 24.  Class actions, of course, are not without their limitations.  My 
previous article addresses some of the predominant criticisms of the class action.  See id. at 41–42.  
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consumer bankruptcy has accomplished more than other reforms—small 
claims courts and low-cost legal assistance, for example—to help consum-
ers obtain relief with respect to disputed debts.47  Indeed, because of bank-
ruptcy’s relative affordability and effectiveness, Whitford dubbed consumer 
bankruptcy “a primary vehicle for delivering the elusive goal of consumer 
justice.”48  Relatedly, bankruptcy’s layers of oversight, while insufficient to 
target all bankruptcy abuse, have been fairly effective at catching egregious 
lender misconduct.  For example, the United States Trustee Program’s in-
vestigation of bankruptcy misconduct played a central role in bringing to 
light the abuses of mortgage lenders and servicers during the worst of the 
foreclosure crisis.49  Second, in addition to consumer bankruptcy’s role in 
furthering consumer protection, bankruptcy courts have the procedural ca-
pacity to handle aggregate actions.  Troy McKenzie recently referred to 
bankruptcy law as “the oldest, most enduring, and most far-reaching form 
of procedural aggregation in use in the United States.”50 
Although debtor classes have attempted to challenge lender miscon-
duct at various points in the last thirty years,51 the debtor class action re-
mains a relatively obscure phenomenon.  The following sections detail two 
primary hurdles that class action adversary proceedings have faced: bank-
                                                          
 47.  Whitford, supra note 3, at 398. 
 48.  Id. at 401.  
 49.  See Clifford J. White III & Ramona D. Elliott, $25 Billion Mortgage Servicer Settle-
ment—Implications for the United States Trustee Program and the Bankruptcy System, 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ust/legacy/2012/04/30/abi_201203.pdf (describing the 
role of the U.S. Trustee Program in achieving a $25 billion dollar settlement with major mortgage 
lenders and servicers). 
 50.  Troy A. McKenzie, Bankruptcy and the Future of Aggregate Litigation: The Past as Pro-
logue?, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 839, 842 (2013).  
 51.  Retail lenders were an early target of debtor class action cases, once evidence came to 
light that many retailers were disregarding bankruptcy law governing the reaffirmation of debt in 
consumer bankruptcy cases.  See Bruce, supra note 4, at 29 (describing this scandal); Conley v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 222 B.R. 181, 182 (D. Mass. 1998) (describing Sears’ reaffirmation prac-
tices); Feder, supra note 9 (noting that “May Department Stores and Montgomery Ward have . . . 
been hit with class action lawsuits over their reaffirmation practices”); In re Singleton, 284 B.R. 
322, 323–24 (D.R.I. 2002) (outlining plaintiffs’ claims against Wells Fargo based on the collec-
tion under an invalid reaffirmation agreement); Bessette v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 279 B.R. 442, 
445 (D.R.I. 2002) (same with respect to Avco Financial Services); In re Aiello, 231 B.R. 693, 699 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999) (noting that debtor alleged that lender had a practice of sending intimidat-
ing communications to debtors to coerce them to sign reaffirmation agreements in violation of the 
automatic stay), aff’d sub nom. Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp., 257 B.R. 245 (N.D. Ill. 2000), 
aff’d, 239 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2001).  More recently, widespread noncompliance by mortgage lend-
ers and servicers has resulted in a number of new class action proceedings in the bankruptcy are-
na.  See, e.g., In re Brannan, 485 B.R. 443, 448 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2013) (alleging robo-signing 
violations); In re Rojas, No. 07–70058, 2009 WL 2496807 at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2009) 
(alleging mortgage lenders filed false proofs of claim); In re Rodriguez, 396 B.R. 436, 439 
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008) (alleging mortgage lenders failed to properly apply plan payment and 
assessed post-petition charges in violation of bankruptcy rules); In re Cano, 410 B.R. 506, 518 
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (same); In re Alcantara, 389 B.R. 270, 273 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008) (al-
leging lender sent misleading mortgage statements in violation of the automatic stay). 
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ruptcy courts’ subject matter jurisdiction of a class of debtors and motions 
to compel arbitration of the proceedings.52 
B.  Jurisdictional Challenges to Debtor Class Actions 
The very concept of a debtor class action may seem, at first blush, to 
be fundamentally at odds with bankruptcy’s debtor-focused jurisdictional 
scheme.53  Indeed, many courts have balked at asserting jurisdiction over a 
nationwide class of debtors, based on bankruptcy’s policy of centralizing all 
claims of or against a single debtor in bankruptcy court.54  In The Debtor 
Class, I explain how many such initial reactions to debtor class actions are 
misplaced.55  While a strong policy of centralization indeed forms the heart 
of bankruptcy jurisdiction, adversary proceedings are treated with a greater 
amount of flexibility.  In contrast to federal courts’ exclusive jurisdiction 
over bankruptcy cases and property of the estate,56 jurisdiction over pro-
ceedings that arise in bankruptcy is nonexclusive57 and subject to transfer to 
state or federal courts in a variety of circumstances.58 
Courts that have rejected debtor class actions based on jurisdictional 
concerns fall largely into three categories.  The first category reads into 
bankruptcy’s jurisdictional framework a requirement that an adversary pro-
ceeding bear some relationship or “nexus” to the representative debtor’s 
case.59  The second category focuses on bankruptcy courts’ exclusive juris-
                                                          
 52.  A third challenge, related to the second, is the difficulty of certifying a debtor class.  Part 
IV discusses this issue. 
 53.  See Bruce, supra note 4, at 43. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  See Bruce, supra note 4, at 50–67. 
 56.  28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (e) (2012). 
 57.  Id. at § 1334(b). 
 58.  See Richard H. Gibson, Home Court, Outpost Court: Reconciling Bankruptcy Case Con-
trol with Venue Flexibility in Proceedings, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 37, 38 (1988) (“[Bankruptcy] pro-
ceedings are discrete pieces of litigation which can involve parties, issues and fact patterns having 
little to do with the other aspects of the case and little connection with the home court. Recogniz-
ing this, Congress provided that venue over proceedings always is transferable to ‘outpost 
courts.’” (footnotes omitted)); see also Bruce, supra note 4, at 59–60 (discussing bankruptcy’s 
abstention and venue rules, which define circumstances in which matters may, or must, be heard 
in other courts). 
 59.  See Knox v. Sunstar Acceptance Corp. (In re Knox), 237 B.R. 687, 693 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
1999) (“[C]lass claims for monetary recovery could only benefit the class members, but could not 
affect the amount of property available for distribution in Knox’s case and thus could not affect 
allocation of property among Knox’s creditors.”); Lenior v. GE Capital Corp. (In re Lenior), 231 
B.R. 662, 668 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999) (“This Court is not a forum for recovery of money that 
would not be part of the bankruptcy estate or of this Debtor.”); Simmons v. Ford Motor Credit Co. 
(In re Simmons), 237 B.R. 672, 676 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999) (“The only case before this court is 
debtor’s chapter 13 proceeding.  The class claims will not affect the amount of property available 
for distribution in debtor’s case, nor will they affect the allocation of property among debtor’s 
creditors.  As a result, ‘related to’ jurisdiction does not support jurisdiction over the class claims 
alleged herein.”); Wiley v. Mason (In re Wiley), 224 B.R. 58, 64 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998) (same); 
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diction over property of the debtor’s estate,60 finding this language requires 
the “home court” to handle any proceedings that arise in the debtor’s case.61  
The third category concerns cases in which the court must exercise its con-
tempt power, typically to punish violations of the automatic stay or dis-
charge injunction.62  Under those circumstances, some courts conclude that 
the dispute at issue must be resolved by the court that issued the relevant 
injunction.63 
The Debtor Class considers and rejects each of these challenges to 
class action adversary proceedings.  It concludes that the first category 
misanalyses relevant law.64  While the second and third categories of cases 
reach more plausible conclusions under the bankruptcy jurisdictional stat-
utes, either the analysis is problematic, or it is equally or more compelling 
to interpret bankruptcy’s jurisdictional provision to permit jurisdiction over 
a nationwide debtor class.65  In sum, The Debtor Class finds few meaning-
                                                          
see also Cline v. First Nationwide Mortg. Corp. (In re Cline), 282 B.R. 686, 692–94 (W.D. Wash. 
2002) (invoking aspects of the early “nexus” cases).  
 60.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e). 
 61.  See, e.g., Williams v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (In re Williams), 244 B.R. 858, 866 (S.D. 
Ga. 2000) (“If the claims raised by Plaintiff on behalf of the putative members of the debtor class 
are ‘property’ of each individual debtor’s bankruptcy estate, § 1334(e) prohibits this Court—or 
any court other than ‘[t]he district court in which [the] case under title 11 is commenced or pend-
ing’ for that matter—from exercising jurisdiction over that property.” (alterations in original)), 
aff’d, 34 F. App’x 967 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Guetling v. Household Fin. Servs., Inc., 312 B.R. 
699, 704 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (same); In re Cline, 282 B.R. at 695–96 (same). 
 62.  For a description of these cases, see Bruce, supra note 4, at 62–64. 
 63.  See, e.g., In re Death Row Records, Inc., No. 06-11205, 2012 WL 952292, at *12 (B.A.P. 
9th Cir. Mar. 21, 2012) (finding that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over a nationwide class 
for claims other than claims punishable by contempt); Montano v. First Light Fed. Credit Union 
(In re Montano), Nos. 7-04-17866 SL, 7-1026 S, 2007 WL 2688606, at *2 (Bankr. D.N.M. Sept. 
10, 2007) (“As a general rule, only the court that issues the disobeyed order or injunction has ju-
risdiction to hold a violator in contempt.”); Guetling, 312 B.R. at 704 (“To the extent those al-
leged out-of-district class members have claims arising from their bankruptcy proceedings in other 
districts, those districts are the proper locations to bring those claims or to potentially pursue ac-
tions for contempt of any court orders.”); Barrett v. Avco Fin. Servs. Mgmt. Co., 292 B.R. 1, 8 (D. 
Mass. 2003) (“The court believes that it lacks jurisdiction over the claims of putative class mem-
bers whose bankruptcies were discharged outside the District of Massachusetts.”); Singleton v. 
Wells Fargo Bank (In re Singleton), 284 B.R. 322, 325 (D.R.I. 2002) (“Subject matter jurisdiction 
in this case is determined by the . . . legal principle that only persons subject to a court’s authority 
may be found in contempt by that court.”); Bessette v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 279 B.R. 442, 449 
(D.R.I. 2002) (“[T]he Court only has jurisdiction over claims that are related to bankruptcy estates 
in the District of Rhode Island.”); In re Williams, 244 B.R. at 867 (“The Court . . . has no jurisdic-
tion to grant declaratory relief for members of the putative class unless the specific discharge in-
junction . . . was entered by the Southern District of Georgia.”); Nelson v. Providian Nat’l Bank 
(In re Nelson), 234 B.R. 528, 534 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999) (“[T]he bankruptcy court has no juris-
diction to entertain a private cause of action for damages by debtors who obtained their discharge 
in a court other than this one.”). 
 64.  Bruce, supra note 4, at 51–56. 
 65.  Id. at 57–72.  This is not to say that a nationwide class always is desirable.  Class counsel 
may find that smaller classes might be easier to manage or bring other strategic advantages.  
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ful jurisdictional limitations on debtor class action adversary proceedings in 
bankruptcy. 
C.  Arbitration Agreements as a Shield to Class Action Liability 
The typical debtor class action adversary proceeding features a class of 
debtors seeking relief against a common creditor.  If the underlying debtor-
creditor relationship is governed by an agreement containing an arbitration 
clause, a creditor might seek to compel arbitration of the proceeding.66  
Creditors may seek arbitration because they believe that the arbitral forum 
will be more convenient or produce a more favorable result.67  As discussed 
in this Part, however, creditors may instead rely on arbitration clauses as a 
tool to avoid class action liability. 
1.  The Liberal Federal Policy in Favor of Arbitration 
Over the last thirty years, the Supreme Court has repeatedly under-
scored that the FAA creates a “liberal federal policy” in favor of arbitra-
tion.68  Although the FAA originally governed negotiated agreements be-
tween sophisticated business parties,69 over time, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the FAA to hold that it applies to consumer adhesion contracts 
and employment agreements, that it affects statutory rights, that it applies in 
state courts, and that it preempts conflicting state laws.70  Buoyed by the 
                                                          
 66.  See, e.g., Belton v. GE Capital Consumer Lending, Inc. (In re Belton), No. 12-23037 
(RDD), 2014 WL 5819586 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2014) (motion to compel arbitration of 
class action proceeding); Rivers v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC (In re Rivers), No. 03-05671-NPO, 
2010 WL 5375950, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. Dec. 22, 2010) (same); Cavanaugh v. Conseco Fin. 
Servicing Corp. (In re Cavanaugh), 271 B.R. 414, 415–16 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001) (same); Knepp 
v. Credit Acceptance Corp. (In re Knepp), 229 B.R. 821, 827 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999) (same). 
 67.  See, e.g., Arentson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. (In re Arentson), 126 B.R. 236, 238 
(Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1991) (“It is extremely doubtful that the plaintiff, a Chapter 7 bankrupt, has 
the financial means to fairly compete with the defendant in an arbitration format.  Indeed, the 
Court suspects that this is one of the predominant reasons that the defendant would like to see this 
matter submitted to arbitration.”). 
 68.  See, e.g., CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012) (noting that the 
FAA “establishes ‘a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements’” (quoting Moses H. 
Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983))); AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (same); EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 
289 (2002) (same); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 
475 (1989) (same); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 
(1985) (same); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24 (same).  For an extensive discussion 
of the development of the FAA, as well as early Supreme Court construction of the FAA, see 
Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbi-
tration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99 (2006). 
 69.  See, e.g., Moses, supra note 68, at 111–12 (“The FAA was a bill of limited scope, intend-
ed to apply in disputes between merchants of approximately equal economic strength to questions 
arising out of their daily relations.”).  
 70.  See id. at 114–55 (describing the Supreme Court’s gradual expansion of arbitration policy 
through 2006).  A rough chronology of this expansion includes the following cases: Moses H. 
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Supreme Court’s strong support of arbitration agreements, contracting par-
ties have embraced arbitration agreements in a variety of previously unim-
aginable contexts, including consumer contracts of adhesion.71  Many such 
clauses attempt to adjust a broad range of contractual or statutory rights, 
such as statutes of limitation, discovery procedures, forum selection, and 
available remedies.72  Courts have approved these types of terms even in 
consumer contracts, despite the fact that such agreements are typically im-
posed on the party with the weaker bargaining position and might contain 
provisions strongly favoring the drafter.73 
                                                          
Cone Memorial Hospital, 460 U.S. at 24 (holding the FAA governs in both state or federal court); 
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (holding the FAA preempts state law); 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 6338 (holding the FAA applies not only to contract matters, 
but also to statutory claims involving antitrust law); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMah-
on, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (holding securities fraud claims under the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 are arbitrable); Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686–87 (1996) 
(holding arbitration agreements may be revoked only by generally applicable contract defenses 
and not by state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 
532 U.S. 105, 114–15 (2001) (expanding the FAA to apply to most employment agreements, de-
spite language in the FAA that it should not “apply to contracts of employment of seamen, rail-
road employees, or any other class of workers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce”); Pres-
ton v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 349–50 (2008) (holding the FAA preempts state laws requiring 
certain disputes to be resolved by state administrative agencies); Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds 
International Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010) (holding that contracts silent on the issue of 
class arbitration cannot be read to permit class arbitration); Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (2011) 
(invalidating California laws that prohibited class litigation and arbitration waivers); and Ameri-
can Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013) (holding that a con-
tractual waiver of class arbitration is enforceable even if arbitration is economically infeasible as a 
result). 
 71.  See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1631, 1639 (2005) (collecting examples).  Arbitration clauses now appear in shrinkwrap licenses 
and mail inserts, product websites, cell phone contracts, checking account agreements, and at least 
once on the doorstep of a restaurant.  Id.; Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The 
Arbitration Fairness Act and the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. 
REV. 457, 464 (2011) (collecting examples); J. Maria Glover, Beyond Unconscionability: Class 
Action Waivers and Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1736–37 (2006) 
(same); see also Stephanie Strom, When “Liking” a Brand Online Voids the Right to Sue, N.Y. 
TIMES, (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/17/business/when-liking-a-brand-
online-voids-the-right-to-sue.html (discussing newer initiatives to include binding arbitration 
clauses on store websites and social media).  For an example of a doorway arbitration clause, see 
Stephanie Mencimer, Eat Burger, Waive Right to Sue, MOTHER JONES, (Jan. 31, 2008), 
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2008/01/eat-burger-waive-right-sue.  
 72.  Glover, supra note 71, at 1742; see also Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconsciona-
bility After Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1005 (1996) 
(“[P]arties are largely free to specify by contract the procedures governing their arbitration.  The 
Court has even suggested that they may be free to specify by contract the remedies the arbitrator 
may award, specifically, whether punitive damages are available in arbitration.”).  
 73.  Glover, supra note 71, at 1743; see also CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, 
ARBITRATION STUDY PRELIMINARY RESULTS 6 (2013) [hereinafter “CFPB STUDY”] (“[C]ourts 
regularly enforce pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer, employment, and other contexts in 
which the relevant contract is not subject to negotiation between the contracting parties.”). 
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2.  Class Arbitration Waivers 
Since the late 1990s, consumer arbitration clauses have increasingly 
contained waivers of the right to aggregate claims into a class action pro-
ceeding.74  Such waivers can be very expansive, foreclosing any aggrega-
tion of claims, whether inside or outside the arbitral forum.75  Some schol-
ars believe the avoidance of aggregate proceedings is a primary reason 
companies include arbitration provisions in consumer financial contracts.76  
Professors Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller, and Emily Sherwin 
studied a sample of twenty-six consumer and 164 nonconsumer contracts 
used by large public corporations, finding that “large companies [in the 
study’s sample] overwhelmingly selected arbitration as the method for re-
solving consumer disputes [but] permitted litigation as the method for re-
solving business disputes.”77  Indeed, seventy-five percent of the consumer 
contracts in the study’s sample contained arbitration provisions, while arbi-
tration provisions appeared in only around six percent of negotiated busi-
ness contracts.78  Moreover, class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts 
seemed essential to the existence of these arbitration agreements.79  Of the 
consumer contracts with arbitration clauses, one hundred percent prohibited 
class arbitration, and eighty percent contained a waiver of other class litiga-
tion rights.80  Sixty percent of these waivers contained non-severability 
                                                          
 74.  Trade journal articles published around this time encouraged corporate counsel to include 
waivers of collective action in form contracts and often recommended that these waivers be draft-
ed as part of an arbitration clause to take advantage of the strong judicial support of FAA.  For a 
thorough discussion of this development of collective action waivers, see Myriam Gilles, Opting 
Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 373, 396–99 (2005).  For recent data on the incidence of these clauses in consumer con-
tracts, see CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 
ACT § 1028(A) 2:6-27 (2015) [hereinafter “CFPB FINAL REPORT”]. 
 75.  See, e.g., CFPB STUDY, supra note 73, at 13 (noting that the terms of arbitration clauses 
studied “effectively preclude all class proceedings, in court or in arbitration”).  
 76.  See, e.g., Glover, supra note 71, at 1736–37 (“Corporations . . . have increasingly sought 
to channel [consumer] claims to arbitration, while at the same time denying claimants the right to 
proceed through class actions.”); Amy J. Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical 
Data in Crafting Arbitration Reforms, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 150 (2010) (concluding 
“companies use arbitration clauses to limit their vulnerability to consumer claims, especially class 
actions”).  
 77.  Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbi-
tration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 871, 881, 883 
(2008).  
 78.  Id. at 882–83. 
 79.  Id. at 883. 
 80.  Id. at 884.  These findings align with the CFPB’s study on consumer arbitration clauses.  
CFPB STUDY, supra note 73, at 37 (“Almost all of the arbitration clauses studied contained terms 
limiting class proceedings.”); CFPB FINAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 2:45 (“[C]lass arbitration 
was unavailable for 99.9% of arbitration-subject credit card loans outstanding, 97.1% of arbitra-
tion-subject insured deposits, essentially 100.0% of arbitration-subject prepaid card loads, 98.2% 
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clauses, which voided the arbitration clause if class procedures were al-
lowed.81  Based on these findings, the authors observed that “[t]he growth 
of mandatory consumer arbitration clauses appears to be part of a broader 
initiative by corporations to preclude or limit aggregate litigation.”82  This 
conclusion finds further support in the Consumer Financial Protection Bu-
reau’s recent study of consumer arbitration clauses, which found that corpo-
rations rarely seek to enforce arbitration agreements in individual suits, but 
commonly move to compel arbitration to block a class action.83 
3.  The Supreme Court’s Rejection of Equitable Challenges to Class 
Arbitration Waivers 
The proliferation of arbitration agreements in consumer contracts has 
drawn the attention of many scholars and commentators, who hotly debate 
the impact of a strong pro-arbitration policy on the vindication of consumer 
rights.84  Critics of consumer arbitration agreements highlight, in particular, 
the impact of class arbitration waivers on negative-value consumer 
claims.85  The class action process has historically been used as a means for 
individuals to pursue claims that are too small to litigate on an individual 
basis.86  If the right to aggregate claims in a class-wide procedure is una-
vailable, small-value claimants may not have the resources to challenge 
wrongful conduct.87  As Judge Posner memorably quipped, “[t]he realistic 
alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero indi-
                                                          
of arbitration-subject payday loan storefronts, and 99.7% of arbitration-subject mobile wireless 
subscribers”). 
 81.  Eisenberg et al., supra note 77, at 884.  
 82.  Id. at 895. 
 83.  See Richard Cordray, Prepared Remarks of CFPB Director Richard Cordray at the Arbi-
tration Field Hearing, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/prepared-remarks-of-cfpb-
director-richard-cordray-at-the-arbitration-field-hearing/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2015) (summariz-
ing the CFPB FINAL REPORT).  
 84.  Compare, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in 
Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 766 (2002) (“‘[M]andatory’ arbitration—arbitration 
imposed by pre-dispute clauses in contracts of adhesion which, as a practical matter, the non-
drafting parties have no real power to avoid or disapprove—will, if allowed to continue un-
checked, largely deprive American courts of the ability to play the important social role they 
played so effectively throughout the last century.”), with Cole, supra note 71, at 469 
(“[N]umerous empirical studies of arbitration demonstrate that consumer arbitration agreements 
typically provide consumers with fair and affordable access to justice.”). 
 85.  See Glover, supra note 71, at 1737 (“[W]here the expected recovery does not justify the 
cost of a stand-alone claim . . . corporations have the greatest incentive to write class action waiv-
ers into mandatory arbitration provisions.”).  
 86.  See Bruce, supra note 4, at 40.  
 87.  See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution Movement Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 165, 184–85 (2003) 
(“Forestalling class litigation in many instances is tantamount to eliminating disputes altogeth-
er.”). 
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vidual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”88  Thus, class arbi-
tration waivers could provide businesses the opportunity to violate consum-
ers’ rights with impunity.89  Critics also argue that arbitration may eliminate 
the procedural protections of a judicial forum, decrease transparency, and 
obscure the development of precedent.90 
Some consumers have attempted to challenge the enforceability of 
class arbitration waivers based upon the barriers to litigation that they cre-
ate.  Two primary theories have emerged: first, that these provisions are un-
conscionable under applicable state law; and second, that they preclude the 
“effective vindication of statutory rights.”91  While these challenges met 
with some success in the lower courts, the Supreme Court’s recent deci-
sions in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion92 and American Express Co. v. 
Italian Colors Restaurant93 sharply limit their continued vitality. 
a.  Unconscionability Challenges and AT&T v. Concepcion 
The FAA provides that arbitration agreements are enforceable, except 
to the extent that “grounds . . . exist at law or in equity for the revocation of 
any contract.”94  The Supreme Court acknowledged in Doctor’s Associates, 
Inc. v. Casarotto that common law unconscionability doctrines could pro-
vide a defense to an arbitration agreement’s enforceability.95  After that 
case, some courts began to “blow[] the dust off their largely dormant un-
conscionability jurisprudence [to] invalidate[] class action waivers.”96 
In Discover Bank v. Superior Court, for example, the California Su-
preme Court applied California’s unconscionability doctrine97 to class ac-
tion waivers in consumer contracts of adhesion, holding that “to the extent 
[such waivers] operate to insulate a party from liability that otherwise 
would be imposed under California law,” they are unenforceable.98  The 
                                                          
 88.  Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 89.  Cf. Colin P. Marks, The Irony of AT&T v. Concepcion, 87 IND. L.J. SUPP. 31, 32 (2012) 
(“If [Concepcion] is read broadly, . . . every corporation will be inserting class action waivers into 
their arbitration clauses (if they have not already), and may be emboldened to go much further.”). 
 90.  See CFPB STUDY, supra note 73, at 7–8 (summarizing criticism). 
 91.  See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 632–37 (2012). 
 92.  131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 93.  133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 94.  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).  
 95.  517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). 
 96.  Gilles & Friedman, supra note 91, at 632. 
 97.  113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).  California permits a court to refuse to enforce a contract it 
finds “to have been unconscionable at the time it was made” and further to “limit the application 
of any unconscionable clause.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1670.5(a) (West 2014).  
 98.  See Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 162–63 (Cal. 2005) (holding “when [a class action] 
waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the con-
tracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the par-
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court’s ruling underscored that the class action device is a vital mechanism 
to vindicate small claims and ensure compliance with the law.99  Following 
the California Supreme Court’s lead, a number of courts around the country 
similarly invalidated class action waivers on unconscionability grounds.100 
The Supreme Court took a decisive stance against California’s uncon-
scionability doctrine in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.101  Concepcion 
involved claims for false advertising and fraud based on AT&T’s alleged 
practice of advertising a cell phone as “free” with a two-year contract.102  
When AT&T moved to compel individual arbitration of the dispute, the 
plaintiffs argued that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable under 
California law because it disallowed class-wide procedures.103  The district 
court held that the class action waiver was invalid under Discover Bank, 
and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.104 
In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court re-
versed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment, holding that Discover Bank “stands as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress” and is thus preempted by the FAA.105  The Court drew a sharp 
distinction between bilateral arbitration and arbitration on a class-wide ba-
sis, finding the latter ill-suited to the arbitral forum: 
 Class-wide arbitration includes absent parties, necessitating ad-
ditional and different procedures and involving higher stakes.  
Confidentiality becomes more difficult.  And while it is theoreti-
cally possible to select an arbitrator with some expertise relevant 
to the class-certification question, arbitrators are not generally 
knowledgeable in the often-dominant procedural aspects of certi-
fication, such as the protection of absent parties.106 
                                                          
ty with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers 
of consumers out of individually small sums of money, then . . . such waivers are unconscionable 
under California law”).  
 99.  Id. at 156–58.  
 100.  See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011) (collecting cases). 
 101.  Id. at 1746–48.  
 102.  Id. at 1744.  Vincent and Liza Concepcion argued, on behalf of similarly situated plain-
tiffs, this advertisement disguised the reality that a sales tax of $30.22 (in the Concepcion’s case) 
would be assessed.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at 1745.   
 104.  Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05CV1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, at *14 
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 
2009), rev’d sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) and amended 
in part, No. 05CV1167 DMS WVG, 2012 WL 1681762 (S.D. Cal. May 9, 2012). 
 105.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 106.  Id. at 1750.  This language closely tracks the Court’s reasoning in Stolt-Nielsen SA v. An-
imalFeeds Int’l Corp., in which the Court held that an arbitration agreement that was silent on the 
issue of class arbitration could not be construed to permit arbitration on a class-wide basis.  130 S. 
Ct. 1758, 1764 (2010).  In so holding, the court underscored the “fundamental changes” wrought 
by class arbitration on the traditional arbitration process, concluding that “the differences between 
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Accordingly, the Court found that doctrines that require the availabil-
ity of class-wide arbitration would “interfere[] with fundamental attributes 
of arbitration and . . . create[] a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”107 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan, argued that the principles advanced in Discover 
Bank align with both the language and the purpose of the FAA.108  The dis-
sent challenged the majority’s support of bilateral arbitration to the exclu-
sion of class arbitration, noting that “neither the history nor present practice 
suggests class arbitration is fundamentally incompatible with arbitration it-
self.”109  The dissent then highlighted the function of the Discover Bank 
rule in preventing the manipulation of consumer contracts to insulate corpo-
rate actors from fraud and argued the state’s decision should be respect-
ed.110 
b.  “Effective Vindication” Challenges and American Express 
Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant 
Other plaintiffs have attempted to challenge class arbitration waivers 
using what has been termed an “effective vindication of statutory rights” 
theory.111  In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the 
Supreme Court held that the FAA permitted arbitration of federal statutory 
claims, but imposed a limitation: Such claims were arbitrable “so long as 
the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of ac-
tion in the arbitral forum.”112  In a subsequent case, the Court acknowl-
edged that if the costs of arbitration were excessive, such costs might be 
sufficient to “preclude a litigant . . . from effectively vindicating her federal 
statutory rights.”113  Some plaintiffs have used this line of reasoning to 
mount an attack on class arbitration waivers, arguing that the cost of bring-
                                                          
bilateral and class action arbitration are too great for arbitrators to presume . . . that the parties’ 
mere silence on the issue of class-action arbitration constitutes consent to resolve their disputes in 
class proceedings.”  Id. at 1776.  But see Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 
2069–70 (2013) (distinguishing Stolt-Neilson and holding that an arbitrator did not exceed its au-
thority by ruling that an arbitration agreement that did not expressly mention class arbitration nev-
ertheless “expresses the parties’ intent that class arbitration can be maintained”). 
 107.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. 
 108.  See id. at 1757 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 109.  Id. at 1759.  
 110.  Id. at 1760, 1762. 
 111.  See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 91, at 633–35 (describing the development of this 
theory). 
 112.  473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985). 
 113.  Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (acknowledging that 
“the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant . . . from effectively vindicating 
her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum”).  
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ing an individual arbitration action prevents the effective vindication of 
statutory rights.114 
A class of merchants mounted such a challenge against American Ex-
press Company (“American Express”), arguing the company violated the 
Sherman Act by forcing the merchants to accept credit cards at rates ap-
proximately thirty percent higher than the fees for competing credit 
cards.115  American Express sought to compel individual arbitration of the 
class members’ claims based on a class arbitration waiver in American Ex-
press’s agreements with the merchants.116  In response, the merchants as-
serted the estimated costs for expert analysis to prove the antitrust claims 
would be “at least several hundred thousand dollars, and might exceed $1 
million,” most of which was non-recoupable, whereas an individual plain-
tiff’s maximum treble-damages recovery would be $38,549.117  The arbitra-
tion costs, the merchants argued, were “plainly prohibitive” of the effective 
vindication of the merchants’ rights.118  The district court granted American 
Express’s motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the lawsuits.119  The 
Second Circuit reversed, holding that because the merchants “would incur 
prohibitive costs if compelled to arbitrate under the class action waiver,” the 
waiver was unenforceable.120 
The Supreme Court considered this appeal in American Express Co. v. 
Italian Colors Restaurant.121  In a 5-3 decision,122 the Court rejected the 
plaintiffs’ arguments and held that the class arbitration waiver was enforce-
able.  The Court emphasized that arbitration agreements must be “rigorous-
                                                          
 114.  Gilles & Friedman, supra note 91, at 633–34 (dubbing this the “second wave” attack on 
class action waivers); see also Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 61 (1st Cir. 2006) (“If the 
class mechanism prohibition here is enforced, Comcast will be essentially shielded from private 
consumer antitrust enforcement liability, even in cases where it has violated the law.  Plaintiffs 
will be unable to vindicate their statutory rights.”).  
 115.  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013).  
 116.  Id.  
 117.  Id.  
 118.  Brief for Respondents at 17, Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (No. 12-133).  
 119.  In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., No. 03 CV 9592(GBD), 2006 WL 662341, at *10 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2006), rev’d and remanded, 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, judg-
ment vacated sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010), rev’d and 
remanded sub nom.  In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 667 
F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 120.  In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 315–16 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 
judgment vacated sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010), rev’d 
and remanded sub nom.  In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 
667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 121.  133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 122.  Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, which Justices Roberts, Kennedy, 
Thomas, and Alito joined.  Id. at 2307.  Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, 
dissented.  Id.  Justice Sotomayor took no part in the decision, as she served on the panel that de-
cided the case in the Second Circuit.  Id. 
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ly enforce[d]”123 and found nothing within the antitrust or class action laws 
to undermine the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration.124  It 
acknowledged the existence of an effective-vindication exception but held 
that the exception applied only to cases in which an arbitration clause 
amounts to a “prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory rem-
edies.”125  The Court made clear that “the fact that it is not worth the ex-
pense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimi-
nation of the right to pursue that remedy.”126  Accordingly, the Court held 
that arbitration of the matter would not prevent the effective vindication of 
statutory rights.127 
Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, mounted a 
forceful dissent that characterized the majority opinion as a “betrayal of our 
precedents, and of federal statutes like the antitrust laws.”128  The dissent 
found the rejection of the effective-vindication defense improper, as “the 
principle we have established fits this case hand in glove.”129  Important to 
the dissent’s reasoning was the text of the arbitration agreement, which 
broadly prohibited not only class aggregation but also “other forms of cost-
sharing . . . that could provide effective vindication.”130  The dissent ex-
pressed concern that the majority’s holding creates avenues through which a 
company might, through strategic drafting of arbitration agreements, elimi-
nate any meaningful recourse for its misconduct.131 
4.  The Current State of Class Arbitration Waiver Jurisprudence 
Taken together, Concepcion and Italian Colors Restaurant may sharp-
ly restrict the availability of class action relief when a class arbitration 
waiver is present.  These cases, along with other recent decisions heighten-
                                                          
 123.  Id. at 2309 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)). 
 124.  Id. at 2309–10 (“The antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the 
vindication of every claim. . . . Nor does congressional approval of Rule 23 establish an entitle-
ment to class proceedings for the vindication of statutory rights.”). 
 125.  Id. at 2310 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 637 n.19 (1985)). 
 126.  Id. at 2311. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. at 2320. 
 131.  Id. at 2314 (“On the front end: The agreement might set outlandish filing fees or establish 
an absurd (e.g., one-day) statute of limitations, thus preventing a claimant from gaining access to 
the arbitral forum.  On the back end: The agreement might remove the arbitrator’s authority to 
grant meaningful relief, so that a judgment gets the claimant nothing worthwhile.  And in the mid-
dle: The agreement might block the claimant from presenting the kind of proof that is necessary to 
establish the defendant’s liability—say, by prohibiting any economic testimony (good luck prov-
ing an antitrust claim without that!).  Or else the agreement might appoint as an arbitrator an obvi-
ously biased person—say, the CEO of Amex.”).  
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ing the standards for certifying a class,132 underscore an antipathy to the 
class device held by a majority of Justices on the Supreme Court.  In the 
few years since Concepcion and Italian Colors Restaurant were decided, 
many lower courts have applied this precedent expansively,133 but some 
have interpreted the cases in ways that preserve some vitality in the uncon-
scionability and effective-vindication challenges.134  The reactions of schol-
ars and commentators to this precedent are similarly mixed: some believe 
that businesses will now flock to arbitration clauses, effectively killing the 
consumer class action, while others argue that the effects of these decisions 
will be more muted.135 
The following Part analyzes these issues in the context of debtor class 
action cases and argues that the effect of this case law should be minimal in 
the bankruptcy arena.  While the FAA’s pro-arbitration mandate is strong, it 
is not absolute, and it must at times give way to countervailing federal in-
terests.136  The federal interests underlying the Bankruptcy Code have long 
provided bankruptcy courts substantial discretion to avoid arbitration of 
matters if arbitration would conflict with bankruptcy’s objectives.  As such, 
bankruptcy courts should adjudicate matters subject to a class arbitration 
waiver when granting arbitration would prevent the vindication of bank-
ruptcy rights. 
III.  THE FAA AND CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS IN BANKRUPTCY 
The prior Part explored the strong federal policies underlying arbitra-
tion and the increasing power of class arbitration waivers as a shield to class 
                                                          
 132.  See infra Part IV. 
 133.  Georgene Vairo, Is the Class Action Really Dead? Is That Good or Bad for Class Mem-
bers?, 64 EMORY L.J. 477, 489–94 (2014) (discussing early application of Concepcion and Italian 
Colors Restaurant); Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration After Concepcion?, 60 
U. KAN. L. REV. 767, 770–93 (2012) (describing Concepcion’s impact).  
 134.  See James Dawson, Contract After Concepcion: Some Lessons from the State Courts, 124 
YALE L.J. 233, 234 (2014) (describing “innovative, narrow readings of Concepcion” adopted by 
certain lower courts); Tina Wolfson & Bradley King, Even After Concepcion and Italian Colors, 
Some Arbitration Agreements Are Not Enforceable, 62 FED. LAW. 19, 20–21 (2015) (discussing 
means to challenge arbitration agreements after Concepcion and Italian Colors Restaurant). 
 135.  See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Ac-
cess to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 727 (2012) (“Concepcion has caused a tsunami wave that is 
threatening to eliminate many consumers’ and employees’ abilities to enforce their substantive 
rights by participating in class actions.  We must look primarily to Congress to take corrective 
action . . . .”); Ian Millhiser, Supreme Court Nukes Consumers’ Rights in Most Pro-Corporate 
Decision Since Citizens United, THINK PROGRESS (Apr. 27, 2011), 
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2011/04/27/176997/scotus-nukes-consumers/ (“After Concepcion, 
it is only a matter of time before nearly every credit card provider, cell phone company, mail-
order business or even every potential employer requires anyone who wants to do business with 
them to first give up their right to file a class action.”).  But see Brian J. Murray, I Can’t Get No 
Arbitration: The Death of Class Actions That Isn’t, at Least So Far, FED. LAW., September 2013, 
at 62, 63 (“[T]he obituary for consumer and employee class actions remains to be written.”).  
 136.  See infra Part III.B. 
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action liability.  This Part argues that this trend should have little relevance 
to class actions brought in consumer bankruptcy cases.  First, class arbitra-
tion waivers may not govern the matters at issue in many debtor class action 
proceedings.137  Second, even if a class arbitration waiver does apply, bank-
ruptcy courts have discretion to refuse arbitration of many such matters un-
der a well-established (but poorly defined) inherent conflict standard.138  
Finally, the “effective vindication of statutory rights” challenge, which the 
Supreme Court constrained in its Italian Colors Restaurant decision, can 
find new life as part of bankruptcy courts’ inherent conflict analysis.139  
Under this view of the inherent conflict analysis, it is appropriate for bank-
ruptcy courts to refuse to compel arbitration of matters that would prevent 
debtor classes from vindicating their bankruptcy rights. 
The analysis in this Part, although technical, necessarily paints with a 
broad brush.  Debtor class action cases can present a host of claims, involv-
ing bankruptcy law, state or federal consumer protection laws, or other legal 
rights.  Moreover, as discussed below, the standard for determining whether 
these proceedings are unsuitable for arbitration is fact intensive and highly 
discretionary.  This analysis thus suggests how courts could approach typi-
cal or common patterns in debtor class action cases.  Considering the role 
bankruptcy courts have historically played in achieving consumer justice, as 
well as the salutatory effects that class actions might have on the enforce-
ment of consumer bankruptcy laws, courts should construe their discretion 
in a manner that enhances the debtor class action. 
A.  The Limited Force of Class Arbitration Waivers in Bankruptcy 
As a preliminary matter, in order for class arbitration waivers to stand 
as a bar to debtor class action relief, the dispute at issue must be governed 
by an arbitration agreement that contains a class arbitration waiver.  While 
arbitration clauses are prevalent in a broad range of consumer contracts,140 
they are not pervasive.  For example, much standard home loan documenta-
tion has historically not included arbitration provisions, given the unwill-
ingness of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to buy certain mortgages loans 
with arbitration clauses on the secondary market.141  In addition, statutes 
                                                          
 137.  See infra Part III.A. 
 138.  See infra Part III.B–C. 
 139.  See infra Part III.D.  
 140.  See CFPB FINAL REPORT, supra note 74, at 2:9-27, 45–46 (describing the incidence of 
arbitration agreements and class arbitration waivers, respectively). 
 141.  Banking—Mortgages: Fannie Mae Will Not Buy Home Mortgages with Mandatory Arbi-
tration Clauses, 72 U.S.L.W. 2463 (2004); Banking—Mortgages: Freddie Mac Will Not Buy Sub-
prime Loans that Contain Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, 72 U.S.L.W. 2342 (2003); see also R. 
Wilson Freyermuth, Foreclosure by Arbitration?, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 459, 480 (2010) (“[S]tandard 
mortgage forms do not contain arbitration clauses at all, or, if they do, they “carve out” foreclo-
sure from their scope.”). 
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such as the Military Lending Act and the Truth in Lending Act have limited 
the use of arbitration clauses in a number of consumer contracts.142  Finally, 
at the time of this writing, the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau 
(“CFPB”) has just completed a major empirical study of the use of arbitra-
tion agreements in consumer contracts.143  The agency is expected to prom-
ulgate new regulations on arbitration agreements, which may further reduce 
the prevalence of class arbitration waivers and curtail the long-term impact 
of Concepcion and Italian Colors Restaurant.144 
Even if an arbitration agreement is invoked in a debtor class action 
case, the scope of the agreement might not be broad enough to encompass 
bankruptcy-specific harms that debtor classes allege.  Although arbitration 
agreements generally are enforceable in bankruptcy,145 even when the 
claims are founded on statutory rights,146 many bankruptcy-related causes 
of action are distinct from the underlying contract.  The Bankruptcy Court 
for the Southern District of New York acknowledged as much in In re 
Hostess Brands, Inc.147  In that case, the court found that issues relating to a 
corporate debtor’s use of cash collateral148 were not subject to arbitration.149  
Although the underlying contract featured an arbitration agreement that 
broadly covered “[a]ny controversy, dispute, claim, or question arising out 
of or relating to this agreement,”150 the court found that the use of cash col-
lateral was a matter “not at all rooted in a right that exists pre-bankruptcy” 
and was therefore beyond the scope of the arbitration clause.151 
Debtor class action proceedings might present similar scope issues.  
Consider, for example, class action claims premised on violations of the 
discharge injunction.  Section 524 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a 
                                                          
 142.  The Military Lending Act prohibits arbitration clauses in connection with certain loans 
made to members of the armed services.  See 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2012).  As of June 1, 2013, the 
Truth in Lending Act bans mandatory arbitration provisions in all consumer contracts that are se-
cured by a dwelling.  12 C.F.R. § 1026.36 (2014). 
 143.  CFPB FINAL REPORT, supra note 74.  
 144.  A number of state attorneys general have urged the agency to place additional regulations 
on the use of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses for financial products or services, stating 
that they “are concerned about such clauses and the class action prohibitions often associated with 
them.”  Letter from Joseph R. Biden, III, Del. Att’y Gen. et al., to Richard Cordray, Dir., CFPB 1 
(Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.attorneygeneral.delaware.gov/documents/20141119-
AGs_Ltr_to_CFPB_re_Arb_Clauses_Final.pdf. 
 145.  See Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149, 1154 (3d 
Cir. 1989) (holding that, for claims derivative of the debtor, the trustee is bound by the debtor’s 
pre-petition agreement to arbitrate).  
 146.  Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987). 
 147.  No. 12-22052-RDD, 2013 WL 82914 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2013). 
 148.  The Bankruptcy Code defines cash collateral as “cash, negotiable instruments, documents 
of title, securities, deposit accounts, or other cash equivalents . . . subject to a security interest.”  
11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (2012).  
 149.  In re Hostess Brands, Inc., 2013 WL 82914 at *4. 
 150.  Id. at *1. 
 151.  Id. at *3.  
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discharge in bankruptcy “operates as an injunction against the commence-
ment or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to 
collect or recover from, or offset against, property of the debtor.”152  Cer-
tainly, a debt that has been discharged may have originated from a contract, 
and the relevant contract might indeed contain an expansive arbitration 
clause with a class arbitration waiver.153  But a court might well conclude 
that the terms of the arbitration clause are not broad enough to encompass 
the bankruptcy-based claims alleged.154 
B.  The FAA’s Goals Must, at Times, Yield to Bankruptcy Policy 
If an arbitration clause in fact governs issues raised in a debtor class 
action proceeding, the creditor-defendant might move for the dispute to be 
resolved in arbitration.155  As detailed above, many such motions are de-
signed to give effect to class arbitration waivers,156 and particularly after 
Concepcion and Italian Colors Restaurant, moving to compel arbitration 
might successfully prevent a debtor class from aggregating their claims.157  
Nevertheless, debtor classes have a unique means to challenge arbitration 
clauses based on the strong federal policies underlying the Bankruptcy 
Code. 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the FAA’s pro-arbitration 
mandate, while strong, “may be overridden by a contrary congressional 
command.”158  Courts have long viewed matters central to the bankruptcy 
process to provide such a command.  Indeed, bankruptcy courts have broad 
discretion to refuse to compel arbitration when arbitration of a matter would 
inherently conflict with bankruptcy law or policy.159  Courts have exercised 
this type of discretion in cases in which the interests of other parties to the 
                                                          
 152.  11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(3) (2012). 
 153.  Some courts have found that arbitration clauses are unenforceable after the underlying 
claim is discharged in bankruptcy.  See Harrier v. Verizon Wireless Pers. Commc’ns LP, 903 F. 
Supp. 2d 1281, 1283–84 (M.D. Fla. 2012); Jernstad v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, No. 11 C 
7974, 2012 WL 8169889, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2012). 
 154.  See, e.g., In re Rivers, No. 03-05671-NPO, 2010 WL 5375950, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 
Dec. 22, 2010) (“[T]he Purported Class Action Waiver, even if applicable in litigation, is too nar-
row to cover the [bankruptcy-based] claims at issue in this Adversary.”); cf. In re Belton, No. 12-
23037 (RDD), 2014 WL 5819586, at *6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2014) (“[G]iven the broad 
language of the arbitration provision here, it cannot be said that the parties clearly did not contem-
plate arbitration of all disputes related to the debt, including whether GE Capital has violated the 
discharge of that debt.”).  
 155.  See, e.g., In re Belton, 2014 WL 5819586, at *1 (creditor moved to compel arbitration); 
In re Cavanaugh, 271 B.R. 414, 418 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001) (same); In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821, 
827 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999) (same). 
 156.  See supra Part II.B; see also In re Rivers, 2010 WL 5375950, at *2 (creditor sought to 
enforce only the class action waiver). 
 157.  See supra Part II.B.3.  
 158.  Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987).  
 159.  See infra Part III.C.2.a–b. 
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bankruptcy would not be served by arbitration, where arbitration of a matter 
would undermine a debtor’s reorganization or affect the court’s ability to 
distribute assets to creditors, and where the proceeding involves substantive 
rights created by the Bankruptcy Code and central to the bankruptcy pro-
cess.160 
The process of determining whether a bankruptcy dispute is unsuitable 
for arbitration relies on a framework first established in Shearson/American 
Express Inc. v. McMahon.161  That case, which dealt with the intersection of 
the FAA, the Securities Exchange Act, and the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act, established a test to determine whether “Con-
gress intended to preclude” parties from waiving judicial remedies in favor 
of arbitration.162  If Congress intended to deny the availability of arbitration 
of a statutory claim, such intent would “be deducible from [the statute’s] 
text or legislative history, or from an inherent conflict between arbitration 
and the statute’s underlying purposes.”163  Courts that have applied 
McMahon to the intersection of bankruptcy and arbitration have found little 
guidance in the Bankruptcy Code’s text or legislative history that would 
foreclose operation of arbitration clauses.164  Thus, courts’ analyses center 
on whether arbitration of the dispute creates an “inherent conflict” with the 
purpose or policies of the Bankruptcy Code.165 
                                                          
 160.  See infra Part III.C.2.b. 
 161.  Shearson, 482 U.S. 220. 
 162.  Id. at 227. 
 163.  Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).  
 164.  See, e.g., Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149, 
1157 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Hays has pointed to no provisions in the text of the bankruptcy laws, and 
we know of none, suggesting that arbitration clauses are unenforceable in a non-core adversary 
proceeding in a district court to enforce a claim of the estate. . . . Similarly, Hays has identified no 
legislative history indicating that this kind of proceeding was intended to be an exception to the 
mandate of the Arbitration Act.”); see also In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 671 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (collecting cases). 
 165.  For a comprehensive study of the inherent conflict test, see Alan N. Resnick, The En-
forceability of Arbitration Clauses in Bankruptcy, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 183, 202 (2007).  
A recent Supreme Court case, which dealt with the intersection of the FAA and the Credit Repair 
Organization Act, might appear to condense McMahon’s three-prong inquiry to a single, plain 
language test.  See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 673 (2012) (“Because the 
CROA is silent on whether claims under the Act can proceed in an arbitrable forum, the FAA re-
quires the arbitration agreement to be enforced according to its terms.”).  One bankruptcy court 
has interpreted this case in a way that subverts McMahon’s inherent conflict test and finds arbitra-
tion agreements broadly enforceable in bankruptcy.  See Blackburn v. Capital Transaction Grp., 
Inc., No. 2:13-CV-98, 2014 WL 923316, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 10, 2014) (“Likewise in this case, 
because the Bankruptcy Code is silent on whether claims under the Act can proceed in an arbitra-
ble forum, the FAA also requires the arbitration agreement to be enforced according to its terms, 
and there is no need to apply an ‘inherent conflict’ test.”).  While CompuCredit Corp. was drafted 
in expansive terms, it does not directly speak to McMahon’s three-prong test or exhibit an intent to 
overrule it.  Moreover, since CompuCredit Corp. was decided, the Supreme Court has declined to 
grant certiorari in a matter involving application of the McMahon test to a bankruptcy issue.  See 
Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Thorpe Insulation Co., 133 S. Ct. 119 (2012).  If the Court were eager to over-
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Many bankruptcy courts begin McMahon’s inherent conflict analysis 
by distinguishing between core and non-core claims.166  Non-core bank-
ruptcy claims typically have too limited of a connection to the bankruptcy 
case to present an inherent conflict under McMahon.  Thus, courts often 
hold that the parties’ agreement to arbitrate should be respected.167  Core 
bankruptcy claims are closely related to the goals of bankruptcy, yet most 
courts have rejected a per se rule governing arbitration of core proceed-
ings.168  Rather, courts consider on a case-by-case basis whether arbitrating 
                                                          
rule McMahon’s inherent conflict test or limit its applicability in the bankruptcy context, it might 
well have taken this opportunity to do so. 
 166.  See Resnick, supra note 165, at 205–06.  “Core” and “non-core” are jurisdictional terms 
used to describe Article I bankruptcy judges’ authority to enter final judgments.  See Stern v. Mar-
shall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2603–04 (2011).  “Core” bankruptcy proceedings are considered to be mat-
ters of substantive bankruptcy law, matters which would only come to light in a bankruptcy case. 
“Non-core” proceedings are proceedings that could have been brought in a state or federal court if 
the bankruptcy petition had not been filed.  Cont’l Nat’l Bank v. Sanchez (In re Toledo), 170 F.3d 
1340, 1348–49 (11th Cir. 1999); Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 97 (5th Cir. 1987).  It 
bears noting that the distinction between core and non-core matters has blurred as a result of the 
Supreme Court’s 2011 ruling in Stern v. Marshall.  See 131 S. Ct. at 2603–04.  In Stern, the Court 
held that some matters falling within the bankruptcy court’s core jurisdiction were not within the 
court’s constitutional authority to resolve to final judgment.  Id. at 2620.  Following Stern, some 
courts applying McMahon’s inherent conflict test have treated such unconstitutionally core mat-
ters as if they were non-core.  See, e.g., In re Edwards, No. 13-02217-8-ATS, 2013 WL 5718565, 
at *2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 21, 2013) (finding that when a matter is unconstitutionally core, “the 
arbitration agreement should control”).  Other courts have used the Stern decision as a justification 
to rely less on the core/non-core distinction when applying the inherent conflict test.  See, e.g., In 
re Trinity Comm’ns, LLC, No. 09-13154, 2012 WL 1067673, at *14 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Mar. 14, 
2012) (“Although the parties spend considerable effort debating whether the issues raised by the 
parties are core or non-core . . . the court finds it more productive to follow the lead of other 
courts . . . and conclude that the core/non-core distinction is not dispositive.”). 
 167.  See, e.g., Hays, 885 F.2d at 1161 (finding arbitration of non-core adversary claims would 
not “seriously jeopardize the objectives of the code,” and that the court did not have the discretion 
to refuse to compel arbitration); see also Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Elec. Mach. Enters., 
Inc. (In re Elec. Mach. Enters., Inc.), 479 F.3d 791, 796 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Hays); In re 
Crysen/Montenay Energy Co., 226 F.3d 160, 165–66 (2d Cir. 2000) (same); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. 
NGC Settlement Trust & Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp. (In re Nat’l Gypsum Co.), 118 F.3d 1056, 
1066 (1997) (holding that the Hays ruling makes “eminent sense” and has been “universally ac-
cepted”).  But see Mintze v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs. (In re Mintze), 434 F.3d 222, 229 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(“The core/non-core distinction does not . . . affect whether a bankruptcy court has the discretion 
to deny enforcement of an arbitration agreement.”); Henderson v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, 
L.L.C. (In re Huffman), 486 B.R. 343, 358 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2013) (“The Fifth Circuit . . . has 
not foreclosed the possibility . . . that a bankruptcy court could deny arbitration of a noncore pro-
ceeding if the opposing party could show it would cause an inherent conflict of interest with the 
Bankruptcy Code.”); AmeriCorp, Inc. v. Hamm, No. 2:11-CV-677-MEF, 2012 WL 1392927, at 
*5 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 23, 2012) (“Although classified as a non-core proceeding, the unique set of 
facts presented in this case, when considered in the aggregate, compel the Court to the conclusion 
that arbitration of this dispute would seriously disturb the objectives of the Chapter 7 bankrupt-
cy.”). 
 168.  See, e.g., In re Nat’l Gypsum Co., 118 F.3d at 1067 (“Cognizant of the Supreme Court’s 
admonition that, in the absence of an inherent conflict with the purpose of another federal statute, 
the Federal Arbitration Act mandates enforcement of contractual arbitration provisions, we refuse 
to find such an inherent conflict based solely on the [core] jurisdictional nature of a bankruptcy 
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the dispute would inherently conflict with bankruptcy’s aims.  The inherent 
conflict test is a fact-specific inquiry, and the standard has developed rag-
gedly among the various circuits.169  Despite well-reasoned calls to reform 
this standard, neither Congress nor the Court has clarified the proper bal-
ance between bankruptcy and arbitration.170 
The Third and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals focus their inherent 
conflict inquiry largely on the legal basis of the asserted claims.171  In these 
circuits, when a cause of action is derivative of a litigant’s bankruptcy 
rights, “the importance of the federal bankruptcy forum provided by the 
Code is at its zenith,” and the bankruptcy court has “significant discretion to 
assess whether arbitration would be consistent with the purpose of the 
[Bankruptcy] Code.”172  In contrast, where a cause of action derives from a 
debtor’s pre-bankruptcy contractual rights, the parties’ agreement to arbi-
trate generally should be respected.173  In the Fifth Circuit, this standard has 
                                                          
proceeding.”).  But see In re Brown, 354 B.R. 591, 603 (D.R.I. 2006) (“The ‘core/non-core’ dis-
tinction represents the best approach for resolving conflicts between the FAA and the Bankruptcy 
Code because it locates arbitration agreements precisely upon the same footing as other forms of 
contracts, while at the same time heeding McMahon’s dictate that a waiver of judicial forum may 
only be prohibited where, inter alia, an inherent conflict is present between arbitration and the 
conflicting statute’s underlying purpose.”). 
 169.  See In re Brown, 354 B.R. at 599 (noting the “widely-divergent” application of precedent 
and “equally divergent” outcomes); Marianne B. Culhane, Limiting Litigation over Arbitration in 
Bankruptcy, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 493, 494 (2009) (noting that despite courts having 
considered these topics for over twenty years, “[n]o clear directions or bright line rules have 
emerged”). 
 170.  See, e.g., Paul F. Kirgis, Arbitration, Bankruptcy, and Public Policy: A Contractarian 
Analysis, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 503, 541 (2009) (arguing to replace the inherent conflict 
analysis with a standard based on bankruptcy litigants’ ability to effectively vindicate statutory 
rights); Robert M. Lawless, Core and Not-So-Core Rhetoric About the Intersection of Arbitration 
and Bankruptcy, 28 No. 7 BANKRUPTCY LAW LETTER 1 (2008) (arguing for a functional approach 
to resolving inherent conflict questions); Resnick, supra note 165 (arguing for legislative change 
to clarify the arbitrability of bankruptcy matters). 
 171.  See In re Mintze, 434 F.3d at 231; In re Gandy, 299 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 2002); Nat’l 
Gypsum, 118 F.3d at 1066.  This standard has been adopted by courts in other circuits.  See, e.g., 
In re Merrill, 343 B.R. 1, 9–11 (Bankr. D. Me. 2006) (applying Nat’l Gypsum and Mintze); In re 
Cavanaugh, 271 B.R. 414, 424–26 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001) (same); In re Transp. Assocs., Inc., 
263 B.R. 531, 535 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2001) (same).  But see In re Payton Constr. Corp., 399 B.R. 
352, 362 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009) (declining to adopt the Fifth Circuit’s analysis).  
 172.  Nat’l Gypsum, 118 F.3d at 1068–69.  In National Gypsum, for example, the Fifth Circuit 
held that the bankruptcy court had discretion to resolve a declaratory judgment action regarding 
whether collection efforts violated section 524(a)’s discharge injunction or the confirmation of the 
debtor’s plan.  Id. at 1071.  The court noted that the action sought to be arbitrated “was restricted 
entirely to the adjudication of federal bankruptcy issues” and permitting arbitration of these claims 
“would be inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code.” Id. at 1070–71; see also In re Gandy, 299 
F.3d at 498 (applying the National Gypsum standard to uphold the bankruptcy court’s decision to 
deny arbitration in case where bankruptcy issues predominated and their resolution “implicates 
matters central to the purposes and policies of the Bankruptcy Code”).  
 173.  In In re Mintze, for example, the Third Circuit held that the debtor’s claims under The 
Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) and various federal and state consumer-protection laws should be 
arbitrated.  434 F.3d at 233.  In so holding, the Third Circuit reversed the decisions of the bank-
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developed into a two-part test: whether “the underlying nature of a proceed-
ing derives exclusively from the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code” and 
whether “arbitration of the proceeding conflicts with the purpose of the 
Code.”174 
The Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have taken a more fluid and 
policy-driven approach to the inherent conflict test.  These circuits look be-
yond the origin of claims to determine whether the substance of the dispute 
mandates resolution in the bankruptcy arena.175  The Second Circuit, for ex-
ample, has emphasized that bankruptcy courts must “carefully determine 
whether any underlying purpose of the Bankruptcy Code would be adverse-
ly affected by enforcing an arbitration clause” based on a “consider[ation 
of] conflicting policies.”176  The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District 
of New York recently described the court’s task as determining whether 
core bankruptcy matters are “‘substantially’ core or truly a function of the 
bankruptcy process.”177 
Courts in these circuits have found a variety of factors relevant to the 
inherent conflict analysis.  These factors principally include bankruptcy’s 
strong policies in favor of centralization,178 protecting constituents from 
piecemeal litigation,179 and permitting the court to enforce its own orders.180  
                                                          
ruptcy court and district court, which found bankruptcy resolution proper because the matter 
would affect other creditors with claims against the debtor’s estate.  Id. at 227.  “With no bank-
ruptcy issue to be decided by the Bankruptcy Court,” the Third Circuit reasoned, “we cannot find 
an inherent conflict between arbitration of Mintze’s federal and state consumer protection issues 
and the underlying purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.”  Id. at 231–32.  
 174.  In re Gandy, 299 F.3d at 495. 
 175.  See In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 671 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2012); MBNA Am. Bank v. 
Hill, 436 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2006); Phillips v. Congelton, L.L.C. (In re White Mountain Mining 
Co.), 403 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 2005).  Each of these circuits takes a slightly different approach 
to this analysis.  For example, the Fourth Circuit appears more willing than the Second and Ninth 
Circuits to adopt a bright line rule that would permit judges to refuse to enforce arbitration clauses 
in all core proceedings.  See In re White Mountain Mining Co., 403 F.3d at 169 (“The Second Cir-
cuit . . . did not deduce from the statutory text a congressional intent to prohibit entirely the arbi-
tration of core issues . . . .  There is the counter argument, however, that the statutory text giving 
bankruptcy courts core-issue jurisdiction reveals congressional intent to choose those courts in 
exclusive preference to all other adjudicative bodies, including boards of arbitration, to decide 
core claims.”).  
 176.  U.S. Lines, Inc. v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass’n (In re U.S. Lines, Inc.), 
197 F.3d 631, 640–41 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149, 1161 (3d Cir. 1989)).  
 177.  In re Hostess Brands, Inc., No. 12-22052-RDD, 2013 WL 82914, at *3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 7, 2013). 
 178.  See, e.g., In re White Mountain Mining Co., 403 F.3d at 170 (finding an inherent conflict 
in an adversary proceeding involving the determination whether pre-petition cash advances were 
debt or equity, based on the need to centralize proceedings in a chapter 11 reorganization).   
 179.  See, e.g., In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 671 F.3d at 1023 (“Arbitration of a creditor’s claim 
against a debtor, even if conducted expeditiously, prevents the coordinated resolution of debtor-
creditor rights and can delay confirmation of a plan of reorganization.”); In re U.S. Lines, 197 
F.3d at 641 (“[T]he bankruptcy court is the preferable venue in which to handle mass tort actions 
involving claims against an insolvent debtor.”).  
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But courts have also found relevant whether the outcome of the proceeding 
would affect other creditors of the estate181 or impair the reorganization 
process;182 whether the proceedings at issue implicate some central purpose 
or purposes of the Bankruptcy Code;183 and whether a bankruptcy court 
might be better suited to handle the claim expeditiously184 or bring to the 
                                                          
 180.  MBNA Am. Bank, 436 F.3d at 108 (listing, among the objectives of bankruptcy to consid-
er in an inherent conflict analysis, “the undisputed power of a bankruptcy court to enforce its own 
orders” (quoting In re Nat’l Gypsum Co., 118 F.3d 1056, 1069 (5th Cir. 1997)); see also Hooks v. 
Acceptance Loan Co., No. 2:10-CV-999-WKW, 2011 WL 2746238, at *5 (M.D. Ala. July 14, 
2011) (“[I]t would seem anomalous to allow an arbitrator to construe a court’s order in a contempt 
setting.”).  
 181.  See, e.g., MBNA Am. Bank, 436 F.3d at 110 (holding that claims for violation of the au-
tomatic stay could be arbitrated because the estate had been fully administered and the debtor had 
received a discharge from chapter 7); see also Sternklar v. Heritage Auction Galleries, Inc. (In re 
Rarities Grp., Inc.), 434 B.R. 1, 11 (D. Mass. 2010) (permitting arbitration of fraudulent transfer 
claim and noting that “[t]here do not appear to be any other creditors or third parties in these pro-
ceedings whose interests might be affected if the claims are resolved by arbitration”); In re Mar-
tin, 387 B.R. 307, 322 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2007) (finding an inherent conflict because the debtor’s 
chapter 13 plan was “entirely contingent” on whether the claim at issue was secured or unsecured 
and the case was “dead in the water” until that issue was resolved). 
 182.  See, e.g., In re White Mountain Mining Co., 403 F.3d at 170 (lower court finding that 
international arbitration would make it difficult for the debtor to obtain funding, undermine credi-
tor confidence in the reorganization, affect the debtor’s business relationships, and add unneces-
sary costs and distractions not clearly erroneous); Ford Motor Cred. Co. v. Roberson, No. WDQ-
10-1041, 2010 WL 4286077, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 29, 2010) (concluding that because the outcome 
of the proceeding will affect the debtor’s resources available to pay her debts, “[a]rbitration of the 
claims against Ford would ‘substantially interfere with [her] efforts to reorganize’ efficiently” 
(quoting In re White Mountain Mining Co., 403 F.3d at 170)). 
 183.  In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 671 F.3d at 1022 (finding congressional intent that the bank-
ruptcy court manage all aspects of a § 524(g) reorganization); In re Eber, 687 F.3d 1123, 1130–31 
(9th Cir. 2012) (“[A]llowing an arbitrator to decide issues that are so closely intertwined with dis-
chargeability would ‘conflict with the underlying purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.’”); In re 
Huffman, 486 B.R. 343, 363 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2013) (highlighting that “Congress clearly con-
templated the regulation of debt relief agencies . . . through the BAPCPA [Bankruptcy Abuse Pre-
vention and Consumer Protection Act]” and refusing to compel arbitration of related matters); In 
re Hostess Brands, Inc., No. 12-22052-RDD, 2013 WL 82914, at *3–4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 
2013) (finding cash collateral issues to be unique to bankruptcy and invoking substantial bank-
ruptcy rights that are central to the bankruptcy process); In re Arentson, 126 B.R. 236, 238 
(Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1991) (“[T]his cause of action is exclusively related to a bankruptcy statute, 11 
U.S.C. § 525(b), which provides an avenue of redress for discrimination solely because an indi-
vidual has filed for bankruptcy relief.  It is a cause of action that literally begs for resolution in a 
bankruptcy forum.”). 
 184.  In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 197 F.3d at 641 (“The need for a centralized proceeding is further 
augmented by the complex factual scenario, involving multiple claims, policies and insurers.”); In 
re Thorpe Insulation Co., 671 F.3d at 1023 (“Arbitration of a creditor’s claim against a debtor, 
even if conducted expeditiously, . . . can delay confirmation of a plan of reorganization.”); In re 
White Mountain Mining Co., 403 F.3d at 170 (highlighting in particular the potential harm of a 
protracted international arbitration on the debtor’s pending reorganization, the ability of the bank-
ruptcy court to resolve the matter expeditiously, and the ability of other parties to participate at 
minimal cost).  But see In re Bailey, No. 07-41381, 2009 WL 8592798, at *5 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 
Oct. 8, 2009) (“The delay, expense, or inefficiency of bifurcated or piecemeal litigation is not suf-
ficient . . . .  Rather, the conflict must rise to the level of substantial interference with the reorgani-
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case a particular legal expertise or familiarity with the facts.185  The impact 
any of these factors might have on the analysis varies greatly from case to 
case. 
C.  Debtor Class Actions Under the Inherent Conflict Test 
Debtor classes have brought a variety of causes of action against their 
creditors, alleging violations of the Bankruptcy Code, federal and state con-
sumer protection laws, or a blend of bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy 
claims.  Some of the most common bankruptcy-based allegations are that 
(1) creditors violated Section 524’s discharge injunction through improper 
practices involving reaffirmation agreements or other post-discharge debt-
collection activities;186 (2) creditors routinely filed proofs of claim that were 
inaccurate,187 contained unlawful fees,188 or failed to include necessary 
                                                          
zation, violation of substantive bankruptcy principles . . . or some other extraordinary interference 
with or evisceration of bankruptcy policy.”). 
 185.  See, e.g., In re Eber, 687 F.3d at 1131 (noting that the bankruptcy court has “special ex-
pertise” to determine dischargeability and familiarity with the case at hand); In re Huffman, 486 
B.R. at 364 (“Of most concern to the Court is that arbitrators on the roster of the American Arbi-
tration Association (“AAA”) need not be attorneys, much less attorneys experienced in bankrupt-
cy law. . . .  Here, the Court finds that arbitration is not an adequate and accessible substitute to 
litigation in this forum, given the nature of the bankruptcy issues involved.”); AmeriCorp, Inc. v. 
Hamm, No. 2:11-cv-677-MEF, 2012 WL 1392927, at *5 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 23, 2012) (refusing to 
compel arbitration of non-core proceedings based on a fear that the defendant would have an un-
fair advantage in arbitration); In re Arentson, 126 B.R. at 238 (expressing concern that the New 
York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers, who presided over the 
arbitration, would not view the matter to be high priority and that the plaintiff may not have the 
means to fairly compete with the defendant). 
 186.  See, e.g., In re Padilla, 389 B.R. 409, 413 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2008) (alleging that lender 
demanded payment of pre-petition and pre-confirmation attorney’s fees in violation of the dis-
charge injunction); In re Cline, 282 B.R. 686, 687 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (alleging lender collected 
debts in violation of the automatic stay and discharge injunction); In re Beck, 283 B.R. 163, 165 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2002) (alleging that lender sought to collect discharged debt); In re Aiello, 231 
B.R. 693, 699 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999) (alleging that lender strong-armed debtors into reaffirming 
debts), aff’d sub nom. Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp., 257 B.R. 245 (N.D. Ill. 2000), aff’d, 239 
F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2001); In re Wiley, 224 B.R. 58, 62–63 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998) (alleging that 
lenders knowingly pursued discharged debts using an unfiled reaffirmation agreement); Nelson v. 
Providian Nat’l Bank (In re Nelson), 234 B.R. 528, 532 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999) (alleging im-
proper reaffirmation practices). 
 187.  In re Simmons, 237 B.R. 672, 674 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999) (alleging lender has a practice 
of filing proofs of claim that improperly characterize an undersecured loan as secured); In re Le-
noir, 231 B.R. 662, 665–66 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999) (alleging that defendants knowingly overvalue 
claims); In re Knox, 237 B.R. 687, 691 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999) (same). 
 188.  In re Rojas, No. 07–70058, 2009 WL 2496807, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2009) 
(arguing that proofs of claim included improper fees); In re Tate, 253 B.R. 653, 658 (Bankr. 
W.D.N.C. 2000) (alleging lender routinely filed proof of claim with an improper “bankruptcy fee” 
in violation of the contract, the Bankruptcy Code, and other consumer protection law); In re Sims, 
278 B.R. 457, 461 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2002) (same); Bank United v. Manley, 273 B.R. 229, 231 
(N.D. Ala. 2001) (same); In re Noletto, 280 B.R. 868, 870 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2001) (same); In re 
Sheffield, 281 B.R. 24, 28 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2000) (same). 
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documentation;189 and (3) lenders misapplied plan payments or assessed se-
cret fees for collection after discharge.190  The variety of legal claims, com-
bined with courts’ divergent and fact-intensive inherent conflict standards, 
makes a thorough analysis of the arbitrability of debtor class action claims 
difficult.  Nevertheless, some useful generalizations can be drawn with re-
spect to a prototypical debtor class action case—a case in which a class of 
consumer debtors sues a common lender for widespread violations of bank-
ruptcy law.191 
Under the Third and Fifth Circuits’ inherent conflict analysis, when 
debtor class action claims involve violations of bankruptcy law, bankruptcy 
courts’ discretion to refuse arbitration is “at its zenith.”192  These courts are 
almost certain to find an inherent conflict in the typical debtor class action 
case.  In addition, debtor class action claims tend to implicate central bank-
ruptcy policies, which may lead courts in other circuits toward an inherent 
conflict finding.  Consumer bankruptcy is designed to further two policies: 
to give “the honest but unfortunate debtor” a fresh start and to provide for 
the fair treatment and distribution of assets to creditors.193  The conduct in 
many debtor class actions violates these policies in significant ways.  For 
example, creditors filing inaccurate proofs of claim or collecting undis-
closed fees might receive a greater share of the debtor’s limited assets vis-à-
vis other creditors, in contravention of bankruptcy’s distributional policies.  
This conduct might also undermine the discharge—a hallmark of bankrupt-
cy’s fresh-start policy—by leaving debtors in a vulnerable position after 
bankruptcy.  Lenders that misuse reaffirmation agreements, carry hidden 
costs for collection after bankruptcy, or fail to remove discharged debt on a 
credit report likewise undermine the discharge by prolonging the debtor’s 
financial instability after the successful conclusion of a bankruptcy case.  
Congress likely intended these claims, which run to the heart of the bank-
ruptcy process, to be resolved by a bankruptcy court.  Many courts have 
                                                          
 189.  See, e.g., Patrick v. Dell Fin. Servs., L.P. (In re Patrick), 344 B.R. 56, 58 (Bankr M.D. 
Pa. 2005) (arguing that Dell Financial Services listed proofs of claim as secured without attaching 
documentation required by Official Form 10). 
 190.  In re Cano, 410 B.R. 506, 518 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (arguing lender misallocated plan 
payments and assessed undisclosed fees for collection post-discharge); In re Rodriguez, 396 B.R. 
436, 439 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008) (same). 
 191.  Debtor class actions based on bankruptcy code violations are likely more prevalent, as 
they have a greater likelihood of passing threshold jurisdictional challenges.  While subject matter 
jurisdiction over debtor classes is becoming less controversial in core matters, courts have 
acknowledged that non-core, state-law claims present a more difficult case.  See, e.g., In re No-
letto, 244 B.R. at 857 (distinguishing cases premised on state law because it “changes the issues 
and jurisdictional posture”).  
 192.  In re Nat’l Gypsum Co., 118 F.3d 1056, 1068 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 193.  Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913) (“It is the twofold purpose of the Bank-
ruptcy Act to convert the estate of the bankrupt into cash and distribute it among creditors and 
then to give the bankrupt a fresh start with such exemptions and rights as the statute left un-
touched.”). 
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reached precisely this conclusion and refused to compel arbitration of these 
matters.194 
A variety of factors might be present in a debtor class action case that 
could lend additional support to a court’s inherent conflict finding.  For ex-
ample, parties in interest have broad rights of intervention in bankruptcy, 
but would be ineligible to participate in an arbitration proceeding between 
debtor and creditor.195  Thus, permitting arbitration could, in some cases, 
eliminate legal rights that would be available to third parties in bankrupt-
cy.196  Additionally, the arbitrators appointed might not be attorneys, let 
alone attorneys with knowledge of bankruptcy law, and might not have the 
experience to apply the law in a manner consistent with broader bankruptcy 
policies.197 
One group of debtor class action proceedings—proceedings involving 
Bankruptcy Code provisions where no express private right of action ex-
ists—is particularly ill-suited for arbitration.  Courts typically find these 
claims remediable either through civil contempt sanctions198 or enforceable 
by operation of the court’s equitable authority under Section 105 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.199  In either case, the means of punishing the alleged 
                                                          
 194.  See, e.g., supra note 183 (collecting cases where arbitration of matters central to the 
bankruptcy process would give rise to an inherent conflict). 
 195.  FED. R. BANKR. P. 7024 (right to intervene in adversary proceedings); John T. Hansen, 
Pushing the Envelope of Creditors’ Committee’s Powers, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 89, 100–02 (2006) 
(discussing intervention rights in adversary proceedings).  
 196.  In re Belton, No. 12-23037-RDD, 2014 WL 5819586, at *4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 
2014 (“Bankruptcy cases are predominantly collective, multi-party proceedings” and “thus, a 
prepetition agreement between the debtor and a creditor that includes an arbitration provision may 
not be said to cover disputes in a bankruptcy case that involve multiple new parties who did not 
agree, pre-bankruptcy to arbitration and who have a statutory right to intervene under section 
1109(b) of the Code.”). 
 197.  In re Hermoyian, 435 B.R. 456, 465 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2010) (“[D]ischargeability and 
other issues relating to the ‘fresh start’ [should be] determined in one forum with particularized 
expertise to do so.” (quoting Holland v. Zimmerman (In re Zimmerman), 341 B.R. 77, 79–80 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006)); In re Oakwood Homes Corp., No. 02-13396PJW, 2005 WL 670310, at 
*5 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 18, 2005) (“[C]ertain fact situations may be expected to bring about fairly 
consistent results, wherever they are tried.  To subject these matters to arbitration, before individ-
uals or tribunals with little or no experience in bankruptcy law or practice, and with little or no 
concern for the rights and interests of the body of creditors, of which the particular defendant is 
only one, would introduce variables into the equation which could potentially bring about totally 
inconsistent results.”). 
 198.  Cox v. Zale Del., Inc., 239 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir. 2001) (suit for violation of section 524 
may be brought as a contempt action); Pertuso v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 233 F.3d 417, 422–23 
(6th Cir. 2000) (same).  But see In re Joubert, 411 F.3d 452, 457 (3d Cir. 2005) (dismissing case 
because no private right of action exists).  Although courts diverge on the extent of Article I bank-
ruptcy courts’ inherent powers, most courts acknowledge that bankruptcy judges possess some 
form of civil contempt authority, whether inherent or statutorily granted.  See generally 2 COLLIER 
ON BANKRUPTCY P. 105.02 (collecting cases).  
 199.  See, e.g., Rojas v. Citi Corp Trust Bank FSB (In re Rojas), No. 07-70058, 2009 WL 
2496807, at *10 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2009) (holding statutory contempt power under Sec-
tion 105 permits courts to order monetary relief for violations of discharge injunction); In re Pa-
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conduct is directly linked with the exercise of judicial authority.  It is either 
vested in the courts by statute, as is the case with Section 105,200 or is 
deemed an inherent component of the judicial role.201  Courts and commen-
tators have widely recognized that it would be improper to vest an arbitrator 
with this degree of judicial authority.202  Indeed, “the ability of a bankrupt-
cy court to enforce its own orders” is an oft-cited factor in an inherent con-
flict analysis.203  As such, for claims that seek remedies based on courts’ 
statutory or inherent powers, an inherent conflict is highly likely to be 
found. 
The fact that these claims are brought on a class-wide basis should, in 
many instances, add further support to the finding of an inherent conflict.  
In recent debtor class action cases, the allegations of systemic harm are 
supported by the staggering incidence of such behavior.  In some cases, dis-
covery reveals corporate policies or communications that either permitted 
or encouraged the alleged violations of bankruptcy law.204  Compelling ar-
bitration of each individual proceeding would fail to capture the broader 
harms of such conduct on the bankruptcy system as a whole.205  As such, 
                                                          
dilla, 389 B.R. 409, 433 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2008) (holding Section 105 remedies violations of Sec-
tion 1327); In re Harris, 297 B.R. 61, 70 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2003) aff’d, 312 B.R. 591 (Bankr. 
N.D. Miss. 2004) (holding Section 105 permits monetary relief for violations of Section 
1322(b)(5)).  
 200.  11 U.S.C. § 105(a) provides, “The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is 
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”  
 201.  See supra notes 198–199 and accompanying text. 
 202.  See, e.g., Hooks v. Acceptance Loan Co., No. 2:10-CV-999-WKW, 2011 WL 2746238, 
*5 (M.D. Ala. July 14, 2011) (“[A]llowing arbitration of contempt proceedings would effectively 
strip the courts of their primary enforcement mechanism.”); In re Cavanaugh, 271 B.R. 414, 426 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2001) (“Enforcement of the arbitration clause under these circumstances would 
be an abrogation of this Court’s obligation to construe and enforce the injunction issuing under its 
authority and to determine the parties’ rights and obligations under bankruptcy law.”). 
 203.  Michael D. Sousa, A Morass of Federal Policy: Enforcing Arbitration Agreements in 
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 15 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3 Art. 2 (2006) (collecting cases that find rele-
vant to an inherent conflict analysis “the undisputed power of a bankruptcy court to enforce its 
own orders”). 
 204.  See, e.g., In re Harris, 280 B.R. 876, 880 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2001) (“It was First Union’s 
policy not to disclose the proof of claim fees on the proofs of claim and its attorneys have been so 
instructed in writing.”); Mark J. Balthazard, The Criminal Side of Sears, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULL., 
Aug. 1999, at 71, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2006/06/30/usab4704.pdf 
(noting that an internal manual used by Sears’ employees advised that reaffirmation agreements 
should not be filed before bankruptcy judges that regularly rejected such agreements based on a 
belief that they were not in the debtor’s best interest). 
 205.  See, e.g., In re Bethlehem Steel Corp., 390 B.R. 784, 794–95 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(“Facts common to many or most of the many hundreds of remaining adversary proceedings being 
prosecuted by the Liquidating Trust are likely to control the outcomes of these four adversary pro-
ceedings.  Uniformity in application of the law to the facts in these federal statutory claims is fur-
thered by federal court litigation and not arbitration.”). 
 2016] VINDICATING BANKRUPTCY RIGHTS 475 
bankruptcy courts will likely find arbitration unsuitable for claims alleging 
systematic bankruptcy abuse.206 
One of the few courts to have considered debtor class actions in the 
context of an inherent conflict analysis, MBNA American Bank v. Hill, im-
properly found the class-wide nature of the action to weigh against an in-
herent conflict.207  In Hill, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
found arbitration appropriate because, among other things, the debtor’s es-
tate had been fully administered, resolution of her claim would not affect 
other creditors of the estate, and the debtor had received a fresh start in 
bankruptcy and was no longer under the protection of the automatic stay.208  
The court then added, “as a purported class action, Hill’s claims lack the di-
rect connection to her own bankruptcy case that would weigh in favor of 
refusing to compel arbitration.”209 
This statement misconstrues the inherent conflict standard.  The inher-
ent conflict test examines conflicts between bankruptcy law and arbitration, 
not conflicts between a bankruptcy debtor and her individual case.  Moreo-
ver, as noted above, debtor class action claims frequently will involve ques-
tions of systemic abuse, which demand a comprehensive resolution that 
likely is not available outside of bankruptcy.  The facts of Hill may well 
have been insufficient to create an inherent conflict.  Yet, to the extent Hill 
stands for the premise that debtor class claims undermine a finding of an 
inherent conflict, it is wrongly decided. 
In sum, a number of factors suggest that courts may find the typical 
debtor class action case to be unsuitable for arbitration under the inherent 
conflict test.  Although the foregoing discussion focused on debtor classes 
that allege violations of bankruptcy law, courts have the discretion to find, 
in appropriate cases, that arbitration of non-bankruptcy causes of action 
would likewise give rise to an inherent conflict.210  Yet the outcome of any 
inherent conflict analysis is uncertain, as courts exercise considerable dis-
cretion when applying this test.  As one commentator noted, the inherent 
conflict test is “so vague and malleable that [it] give[s] courts license to do 
almost anything they want.”211  Moreover, in light of the Supreme Court’s 
strong embrace of the FAA in disputes covered by class arbitration waivers, 
                                                          
 206.  See, e.g., In re Belton, No. 12-23037-RDD, 2014 WL 5819586, at *10 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 10, 2014) (“[C]omplete and consistent relief is more likely to occur if it is determined by—
and with the possible remedial supervision of—a bankruptcy court than on an arbitration-by-
arbitration basis of separate alleged violations of the discharge.”).  
 207.  See MBNA Am. Bank v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 208.  Id. at 109. 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  See, e.g., AmeriCorp, Inc. v. Hamm, No. 2:11-CV-677-MEF, 2012 WL 1392927, at *5 
(M.D. Ala. Apr. 23, 2012) (highlighting how the trustee’s non-core breach-of-contract claim bears 
such impact on the debtor’s bankruptcy case that arbitration would give rise to an inherent con-
flict).  
 211.  Kirgis, supra note 170, at 520.  
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bankruptcy courts might feel pressured to construe the inherent conflict test 
more narrowly in debtor class action cases than in other contexts. 
In light of this uncertainty, the following Section makes the affirma-
tive case that courts should consider debtor classes’ ability to vindicate 
bankruptcy rights as a central factor of McMahon’s inherent conflict analy-
sis.  If permitting a claim to be resolved in arbitration would eliminate an 
affordable procedural path for debtor classes to remedy violations of bank-
ruptcy law or otherwise achieve consumer bankruptcy’s goals, bankruptcy 
courts should refuse to compel arbitration of the dispute. 
D.  Ensuring the Effective Vindication of Bankruptcy Rights Through 
the Inherent Conflict Analysis 
Ordering arbitration of a debtor class action could make it financially 
infeasible for a class of debtors to find recourse for conduct that violates 
their  bankruptcy rights.  Although this reality is most pronounced when 
compelling arbitration would give effect to a class arbitration waiver, it 
could conceivably be present if the debtors’ up-front costs to a class-wide 
arbitration proceeding are prohibitive.  This Section argues that when order-
ing arbitration would impede a debtor class’s ability to vindicate bankrupt-
cy rights, courts should find that an inherent conflict exists. 
As noted above, courts construing the inherent conflict test in bank-
ruptcy must balance the competing federal policies underlying the Bank-
ruptcy Code and the FAA.  Although the test varies from jurisdiction to ju-
risdiction, at its base the inquiry focuses on how arbitrating a matter might 
interfere with bankruptcy’s goals.212  For example, courts have refused to 
compel arbitration if arbitration would “make it very difficult for the debtor 
to attract additional funding . . . , undermine creditor confidence . . . , im-
pose additional costs on the estate, and divert the attention and time of the 
debtor’s management.”213  Conversely, courts have found arbitration appro-
                                                          
 212.  This focus is clear in the more policy-driven analyses of the Second, Fourth, and Ninth 
Circuits, but it likewise motivates, at least in part, courts’ analyses in the Third and Fifth Circuits.  
See, e.g., In re Gandy, 299 F.3d 489, 499 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding an inherent conflict, in part, be-
cause the remedy of substantive consolidation “may be out of reach in arbitration”); Hays & Co. 
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149, 1161 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[W]e must 
carefully determine whether any underlying purpose of the Bankruptcy Code would be adversely 
affected by enforcing an arbitration clause and that we should enforce such a clause unless that 
effect would seriously jeopardize the objectives of the Code.”); see also In re Brown, 354 B.R. 
591, 599 (D.R.I. 2006) (summarizing several circuit-level decisions on this issue by noting that 
“each [court] looks to what kind of dispute is at issue and how arbitration of the dispute will affect 
the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code and the FAA”).  
 213.  Phillips v. Congleton, L.L.C. (In re White Mountain Mining Co.), 403 F.3d 164, 170 (4th 
Cir. 2005); see also U.S. Lines, Inc. v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass’n (In re U.S. 
Lines, Inc.), 197 F.3d 631, 641 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[A]rbitration of the disputes raised in the Com-
plaint would prejudice the Trust’s efforts to preserve the Trust as a means to compensate claim-
ants.” (quoting U.S. Lines, Inc. v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass’n, 169 B.R. 804, 825 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994))); In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 671 F.3d 1011, 1023 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Ar-
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priate when it “would not interfere with or affect the distribution of the es-
tate.”214  As part of this ends-focused inquiry, courts naturally must consid-
er the financial ramifications of ordering a class of consumer debtors to pur-
sue their claims in arbitration.215 
In Italian Colors Restaurant, the Supreme Court rejected similar fi-
nancial considerations in the context of an effective vindication challenge to 
a class arbitration waiver.216  In so doing, the Court refused to “tally[] the 
costs and burdens” of resolving claims in arbitration when deciding whether 
to enforce an arbitration clause.217  This holding should not, however, have 
any bearing on bankruptcy courts’ inherent conflict analysis.  Italian Colors 
Restaurant involved the intersection of the FAA and the Sherman Act, 
which courts have long held does not present a conflict with the FAA under 
any prong of McMahon.218  Moreover, the effective vindication-exception is 
a functional test; it considers only whether arbitration would impede a liti-
gant’s ability to assert her statutory rights.219  The inherent conflict test is a 
broader and more nuanced inquiry,220 balancing the underlying purposes of 
competing federal statutes to determine whether arbitration or a conflicting 
federal policy should prevail.221  When balancing the competing policies of 
                                                          
bitration of a creditor’s claim against a debtor, even if conducted expeditiously, prevents the coor-
dinated resolution of debtor-creditor rights and can delay the confirmation of a plan of reorganiza-
tion.”). 
 214.  MBNA Am. Bank v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2006).  
 215.  Compare In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821, 845 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999) (“A debtor who has 
filed a bankruptcy petition generally cannot afford arbitration fees. . . . Monies used to pay for 
arbitration will mean less money to fund the plan and pay creditors.  The existence of these actual 
conflicts permit this Court to exercise its discretion and deny arbitration.”), with In re Durango 
Ga. Paper Co., 309 B.R. 394, 402 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2004) (finding arbitration appropriate where 
debtor failed to show that it would impose greater expense or delay than a bankruptcy-court reso-
lution). 
 216.  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013). 
 217.  Id. (“The regime established by the Court of Appeals’ decision would require—before a 
plaintiff can be held to contractually agreed bilateral arbitration—that a federal court determine 
(and the parties litigate) the legal requirements for success on the merits claim-by-claim and theo-
ry-by-theory, the evidence necessary to meet those requirements, the cost of developing that evi-
dence, and the damages that would be recovered in the event of success.  Such a preliminary liti-
gating hurdle would undoubtedly destroy the prospect of speedy resolution that arbitration in 
general and bilateral arbitration in particular was meant to secure.”).  
 218.  See id. at 2310.  Indeed, before the Italian Colors Court rejected challenges to class arbi-
tration waivers based on the effective-vindication theory, the Court first held that Congress had 
not demonstrated its intent that claims should be non-arbitrable based on a competing federal poli-
cy.  Id.  
 219.  See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000). 
 220.  See Ferguson v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 733 F.3d 928, 936 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The effective 
vindication and inherent conflict exceptions are two sides of the same coin—the former turning on 
the ability to vindicate a statute, and the latter turning on the underlying purposes of a statute.”). 
 221.  See AmeriCorp, Inc. v. Hamm, No. 2:11-cv-677-MEF, 2012 WL 1392927, at *3 (M.D. 
Ala. Apr. 23, 2012) (“Although not explicitly stated in the case law, it is self-evident that the ‘in-
herent conflict’ test requires a balancing of the legislative interests in play in a particular case.”); 
Kirgis, supra note 170, at 516 (noting that courts applying the inherent conflict test “essentially 
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bankruptcy and arbitration, courts naturally have considered—and should 
continue after Italian Colors Restaurant to consider—how the cost to the 
debtor of ordering arbitration might affect bankruptcy policy. 
Applying the inherent conflict test in this manner is consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration jurisprudence.  Although the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly emphasized that “courts must rigorously enforce arbi-
tration agreements according to their terms,”222 this principle has limited 
applicability in the bankruptcy arena, where the very purpose is to adjust 
pre-bankruptcy contractual rights to reach a global resolution of a debtor’s 
financial distress.223  Relatedly, the FAA’s policies are designed to protect 
the interests of parties that have contracted for arbitration, but bankruptcy is 
a multi-party enterprise involving a variety of interests beyond the interests 
of parties to a given arbitration clause.224  Although the FAA’s freedom-of-
contract principles have been strongly supported by the Supreme Court, the 
Court also developed the inherent conflict test to address precisely these 
types of policy conflicts.  Properly applied, the inherent conflict test should 
permit arbitration to prevail over issues that are essentially two-party dis-
putes and that do not affect the bankruptcy case, and find that bankruptcy 
trumps the FAA for matters that bear directly on bankruptcy’s goals. 
In both Concepcion and Italian Colors Restaurant, however, the ma-
jority of the Court not only promoted arbitration, but derided class-wide ar-
bitration as slower and less efficient than traditional arbitration.225  Yet it 
does not follow that bankruptcy court resolution of debtor class claims will 
be similarly inefficient.  The bankruptcy process, like traditional arbitration, 
is well-suited to handle claims quickly and with minimal litigation costs.226  
                                                          
balance the policy in favor of arbitration against the policy in favor of consolidated and expedited 
bankruptcy resolution”). 
 222.  Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2309 (quoting Dean Willer Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 
U.S. 213, 221 (1985)); see also AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 
(2011).  
 223.  See Mette Kurth, Comment: An Unstoppable Mandate and an Immovable Policy: The 
Arbitration Act and the Bankruptcy Code Collide, 43 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 999, 1030 (1996).  Bank-
ruptcy’s effect on contract rights can be observed in a number of instances, such as the avoidance 
of prepetition transfers, the assumption or rejection of executory contracts, the invalidation of ipso 
facto clauses, and the discharge itself.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 324, 365(e), 544, 727 (2012). 
 224.  See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Coming Encounter: International Arbitration 
and Bankruptcy, 67 MINN. L. REV. 595, 607–09 (1983) (explaining how bankruptcy policy avoids 
the diminution of the debtor’s assets through judgments obtained in other forums during the pen-
dency of the bankruptcy case).  
 225.  Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2312  (“[T]he switch from bilateral to class arbitra-
tion . . . sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and makes the process 
slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment.” (quoting 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751)). 
 226.  Stephen J. Ware, Similarities Between Arbitration and Bankruptcy Litigation, 11 NEV. 
L.J. 436, 438 (2011) (noting bankruptcy litigation “tends to move more quickly than non-
bankruptcy litigation, with a shortened discovery process and an earlier hearing,” leading to lower 
process costs).  
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Moreover, unlike arbitration panels, bankruptcy courts have extensive expe-
rience dealing with massive cases and may have some expertise with class 
certification standards.227  Thus, to the extent businesses contract for arbi-
tration to realize the benefits of efficiency and speed, these goals may be 
satisfied in bankruptcy class action adversary proceedings. 
In sum, it is consistent with both the language and the spirit of Su-
preme Court precedent to revive effective vindication’s financial considera-
tions in the context of McMahon’s inherent conflict analysis.  In so doing, if 
arbitration would undermine a debtor class’s ability to vindicate bankruptcy 
rights, an inherent conflict should be found.  Although determining whether 
bankruptcy rights would be undermined by arbitration is a fact-intensive 
consideration, the presence of a class arbitration waiver, prohibitive arbitra-
tion costs, or other impediments that affect bankruptcy’s aims would seem 
to indicate that an inherent conflict exists. 
IV.  CERTIFYING A DEBTOR CLASS 
The prior Part argued class arbitration waivers should be unenforcea-
ble in bankruptcy under McMahon’s inherent conflict test when arbitration 
of a matter would preclude the vindication of bankruptcy rights.  But even 
if debtor class actions survive challenges based on class arbitration waivers, 
class litigants must still face the rigors of class certification.  Bankruptcy 
Rule 7023 incorporates Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
adversary proceedings.228  Accordingly, purported classes must satisfy Rule 
23’s requirements of numerosity,229 commonality,230 typicality,231 and ade-
quacy of representation,232 as well as one or more of Rule 23(b)’s require-
ments,233 to be certified.  Over the last several years, federal courts have 
ratcheted up the evidentiary standards for class certification, requiring more 
                                                          
 227.  Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is incorporated into the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure.  See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7023. 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (The potential class must be “so numerous that joinder of all 
members is impracticable.”). 
 230.  Id. at 23(a)(2) (requiring the potential class to raise common questions of law or fact). 
 231.  Id. at 23(a)(3) (“[T]he claims and defenses of the representative parties [must be] typical 
of the claims or defenses of the class.”). 
 232.  Id. at 23(a)(4) (requiring that class representatives “fairly and adequately protect the in-
terests of the class”). 
 233.  Rule 23(b)(1) is appropriate if prosecuting the actions separately would create a risk of 
inconsistent results that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing 
the class or absent class members.  Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate when the claimants seek primarily 
declaratory or injunctive relief in cases where “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to 
act on grounds that apply generally to the class.”  Id. at 23(b)(2). Rule 23(b)(3) applies when 
common questions of law or fact predominate and the class action is a superior method of adjudi-
cation.  Typically, consumer claims are asserted under subjection (b)(2) or (b)(3). 
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proof at the class certification stage than previously required.234  In addi-
tion, a line of recent decisions has made various elements of certification 
markedly more difficult to achieve.235  As a result, lenders’ attorneys have 
multiple avenues to prevent certification in debtor class action cases.236 
But despite these trends, many debtor class actions may be able to run 
the gantlet of modern class certification.237  Indeed, the most troubling ex-
amples of lender behavior in bankruptcy involve violations of debtors’ 
rights as a general business practice or matter of policy.238  Quite frequent-
ly, examples of overreaching take the form of a routine assessment of fees, 
form agreement, or other standardized practice or procedure.239  These types 
of claims are well-suited to satisfy even the stringent certification standards 
of modern class actions. 
A thorough analysis of the certification of debtor class claims, particu-
larly in light of the variety of potential debtor class causes of action, ex-
ceeds the scope of this Article.  This Part instead addresses, in general 
terms, how debtor class actions may fare under modern class certification 
requirements.  First, few debtor class action cases will have trouble meeting 
the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a).240  Large lenders often have 
hundreds of customers in bankruptcy proceedings at any given time,241 and 
abusive practices might go on for years before they are discovered or class 
                                                          
 234.  See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729 (2013) 
(describing these trends).  
 235.  See id.  
 236.  Id. 
 237.  See, e.g., In re Rodriguez, 695 F.3d 360, 366–67 (5th Cir. 2012) (affirming bankruptcy 
court’s certification of debtor class); Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, In 
re Brannan, 485 B.R. 443 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2013) (certifying a class of debtors alleging robo-
signing violations). 
 238.  See, e.g., In re Rodriguez, 432 B.R. 671, 701 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010) (holding lender’s 
practice of assessing fees ignored Bankruptcy Rule 2016(a)), aff’d, 695 F.3d 360; In re Noletto, 
281 B.R. 36, 42 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2000) (finding commonality because “counsel charged a set fee 
in the cases and followed a pattern or several patterns in dealing with postpetition/preconfirmation 
actions in chapter 13 bankruptcy cases”). 
 239.  See, e.g., In re Harris, 280 B.R. 876, 880 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2001) (“It was First Union’s 
policy not to disclose the proof of claim fees on the proofs of claim and its attorneys have been so 
instructed in writing.”). 
 240.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).  While more than forty class members is often found to be suffi-
cient to establish numerosity, bankruptcy courts may require a higher threshold due to their expe-
rience handling large numbers of litigants.  See, e.g., In re TWL Corp., 712 F.3d 886, 895 (5th 
Cir. 2013) (noting that numerosity might be more difficult to satisfy for a class of employee credi-
tors because normal bankruptcy procedures are designed to deal with large numbers of claims). 
 241.  See, e.g., In re Rodriguez, 432 B.R. at 693 n.29 (certifying a 125-person class from a pool 
of approximately 750 debtors in the Southern District of Texas who might have been subject to 
the alleged wrongdoing); In re Harris, 280 B.R. at 880 (finding numerosity is satisfied because 
“[t]here will be hundreds or thousands of potential class members in all states”); Conley v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 222 B.R. 181, 183 (D. Mass. 1998) (describing Sears affidavit listing 2,733 bank-
ruptcy cases in Massachusetts in which it used unfiled reaffirmation agreements between 1995 and 
1997).  
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action remedies are sought.242  These classes are also ascertainable, as bank-
ruptcy court dockets are publically available, and counsel can easily search 
for cases in which a certain lender was a party.243  The typicality and ade-
quacy of representation requirements of Rule 23(a) present no unique issues 
in debtor class action cases. 
The commonality requirement may pose challenges for certain debtor 
classes, particularly in the wake of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.244  In 
Dukes, the Supreme Court found that a class of 1.5 million current and for-
mer female Wal-Mart employees, who alleged violations of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, failed to establish commonality.245  The Court 
noted that “‘[w]hat matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of 
common “questions”—even in droves—but, rather the capacity of a class-
wide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of 
the litigation.’”246  After Dukes, courts tend to look for a common conduct, 
policy, or practice that underlies the claims of putative class members in or-
der to find the commonality factor satisfied.247  As noted above, in many 
debtor class action cases, the harm alleged is premised on standard forms, 
routine practices, or other systematic conduct by large, institutional lend-
ers.248  In some cases, policy manuals or written instructions delineate the 
abusive conduct.249  For matters premised on federal bankruptcy laws, 
choice-of-law issues will infrequently arise.250 
                                                          
 242.  See, e.g., In re Brannan, 485 B.R. at 448 (certifying a class of Wells Fargo defendants 
alleging bankruptcy abuse that occurred from 1996 to 2008).  Moreover, courts may find the small 
value of many debtor class action claims to weigh in favor of numerosity, as individual class 
members might lack the resources or motivation to file a separate action.  Id.; see also In re Ro-
driguez, 432 B.R. at 693–94 (finding numerosity satisfied based on the number of plaintiffs, the 
existence of small claims, and considerations of judicial economy). 
 243.  See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013); MOORE’S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE 23.21 (stating the implied condition to certification that an identifiable class must ex-
ist); see also Pacer Case Locator, https://pcl.uscourts.gov/search (last visited Aug. 9, 2015) (allow-
ing for searches by party name). 
 244.  131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 245.  Id. at 2552. 
 246.  Id. at 2551 (alteration in original) (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in 
the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)). 
 247.  5-23 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE—CIVIL § 23.23 (“Some courts have concluded that 
Wal-Mart heightened the standards for establishing commonality.”). 
 248.  See supra note 238 and accompanying text. 
 249.  See supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
 250.  In re Sheffield, 281 B.R. 24, 28 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2000) (“There is no choice of law issue 
involved since the only issues raised by the potential class are federal bankruptcy law issues.”); In 
re Noletto, 281 B.R. 36, 42 (2000) (same).  But see Peterson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Pe-
terson), 281 B.R. 685, 689 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2002) (finding class certification inappropriate be-
cause of differences in jurisdictions recognizing the right to allow debts to “ride through” the 
bankruptcy case); In re Walls, 262 B.R. 519, 525–26 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2001) (same). 
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Even in cases in which individualized issues exist,251 a flawed process 
for handling cases might provide the necessary commonality.  In In re 
Brannan, for example, the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Ala-
bama certified a class of debtors who sought to enjoin Wells Fargo from 
preparing unreliable affidavits to support relief from stay motions.252  Alt-
hough the impact of this behavior varied across the class—notably, many 
affidavits, although “robo-signed,” were factually correct—the court found 
common issues to be present.253  “If every affidavit was prepared pursuant 
to a tainted process, every affidavit was untrustworthy at the time the court 
and debtors relied on it.”254  For these reasons, even under Dukes’ “rigor-
ous” standard, commonality in debtor class actions may be found. 
Most debtor class action cases that have achieved class certification 
have done so under Rule 23(b)(2), which requires that the defendant “has 
acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that 
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate.”255  
Cases that allege systematic misconduct have achieved certification under 
this standard when they seek a broad injunction that covers a common con-
duct in a wide range of cases.256  While money damages are theoretically 
                                                          
 251.  See, e.g., In re Powe, 278 B.R. 539 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2002) (decertifying class for re-
maining issue of the reasonableness of fees because the class lacked commonality); In re Harris, 
280 B.R. 876, 885 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2001) (finding the issue of reasonableness of fees to fail 
commonality and typicality grounds); see also In re Aiello, 231 B.R. 693, 712 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
1999) (“There is no commonality . . . in the issue of compensation for actual damage . . . .  For 
example, some letter recipients may claim no damage, some may claim attorney’s fees incurred in 
responding to the letter, some may seek to recover payments made under invalid reaffirmation 
agreements, some . . . may claim emotional distress, and still others may claim some combination 
of such damages.”), aff’d sub nom. Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp., 257 B.R. 245 (N.D. Ill. 2000), 
aff’d, 239 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2001).  
 252.  In re Brannan, 485 B.R. 443, 450–51 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2013) (“The facts alleged are that 
affidavits were not reviewed carefully by affiants and notarization was done in a manner that 
flaunted state law regarding notaries public.  What the court relied on—the affiant’s word and the 
notary’s attestation—are untrue on a consistent basis.  One or both parts of the affidavit process—
affiant swearing of his/her personal knowledge to the truth of the facts in an affidavit and affiant 
doing such swearing in the presence of a notary public who signed according to state law—did not 
occur.”).  
 253.  Id. at 457.  The court also rejected Wells Fargo’s contention that no policy applicable to 
all class members existed and that commonality was therefore not present.  “This production of 
affidavits without proper supervision and oversight and in numbers too large to allow due care is 
the policy at issue.”  Id. at 457–58. 
 254.  Id. at 457.  
 255.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 256.  See, e.g., In re Brannan, 485 B.R. at 459  (holding, on motion for reconsideration, that 
injunctive class may be certified to enjoin Wells Fargo from profiting from longstanding miscon-
duct); In re Death Row Records, Inc., No. 06-11205, 2012 WL 952292, at *12 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
Mar. 21, 2012) (certifying a (b)(2) class to determine trustees’ rights to escheated funds); In re 
Rodriguez, 432 B.R. 671, 710 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010) (certifying (b)(2) class to enjoin Country-
wide’s bankruptcy practices), aff’d, 695 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2012); In re Harris, 280 B.R. at 883 
(certifying class seeking primarily injunctive relief—to have an improper fee “wiped off their ac-
count balances”). 
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available under this provision, Dukes makes clear that they must be inci-
dental to the injunctive or declaratory relief sought.257  Many such litigants 
have declined to seek individualized damages or disgorgement, as measur-
ing such damages complicates the certification inquiry.258 
Debtor classes may seek damages under Rule 23(b)(3), which permits 
money damages in cases in which “questions of law or fact common to 
class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members,” and a class-wide resolution is “superior to other available meth-
ods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”259  After the Su-
preme Court’s recent decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, however, it has 
arguably become more difficult to certify cases in which individual ques-
tions of damages predominate.260  In Comcast, a class of cable service sub-
scribers sought damages for alleged antitrust violations by their cable pro-
vider.261  The plaintiffs’ model for calculating damages was based, in part, 
on theories of liability that had been rejected at the lower court level.262  
The Court underscored that courts must undertake a “rigorous analysis” of 
Rule 23’s standards and indicated the predominance requirement cannot be 
satisfied where “[q]uestions of individual damage calculations will inevita-
bly overwhelm questions common to the class.”263  Because the plaintiffs 
did not demonstrate that damages were “susceptible of measurement across 
the entire class,” the Court reversed the lower courts’ orders permitting cer-
tification.264  Four dissenting Justices took pains to underscore that “the 
opinion breaks no new ground on the standard for certifying a class ac-
tion . . . [and] should not be read to require . . . that damages attributable to 
a classwide injury be measurable on a class-wide basis.”265  Yet courts have 
struggled to define the reach of Comcast, particularly outside the context of 
antitrust suits.266 
                                                          
 257.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 258.  See, e.g., In re Rodriguez, 695 F.3d at 366–67 (affirming bankruptcy court’s certification 
of (b)(2) class that avoided individualized damages, and noting “[t]he focus is properly upon 
Countrywide’s fee assessment and collection practice, not on the individualized manner in which 
each class member may have been affected by the practices”).  
 259.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).  The court, when measuring these predominance and superiority 
factors, should consider “the class members’ interests in individually controlling . . . separate ac-
tions”; “the extent and nature of any litigation . . . begun by or against class members”; “the desir-
ability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum”; and 
“the likely difficulties in managing a class action.”  Id.  
 260.  See 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432–33 (2013). 
 261.  Id. at 1429–30. 
 262.  Id. at 1430. 
 263.  Id. at 1432–33. 
 264.  Id. at 1433. 
 265.  Id. at 1436 (Ginsburg, J., and Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 266.  Compare Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 514 (9th Cir. 2013) (distinguishing 
Comcast), with Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp., No. 3:10–CV-0591 (TJM/DEP), 2013 WL 1316452, 
at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2013) (applying Comcast to find predominance element unsatisfied 
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Many debtor class action cases, particularly those that involve the im-
proper assessment of fees, seek damages that can easily be calculated using 
lenders’ accounting programs and software.  In this context, courts may dis-
tinguish Comcast and find the predominance inquiry satisfied.267  For ex-
ample, in Levya v. Medline Industries, Inc., the Ninth Circuit noted that 
“unlike in Comcast . . . , damages will be calculated based on the wages 
each employee lost due to Medline’s unlawful practices.”268  Because the 
lost wages were easily tallied using defendant’s computerized payroll and 
timekeeping database, the court found the class could be certified.269 
In cases in which damages inquiries are more individualized, courts 
might instead use Rule 23(c)(4) to certify a class with respect to the issue of 
liability only.270  This Rule provides that “[w]hen appropriate, an action 
may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular is-
sues.”271  Some courts and commentators have speculated that such a bifur-
cated approach might become a primary means to preserve the class action 
model in the wake of Comcast.272  In the debtor class action context, the 
Fifth Circuit has recently affirmed the use of Rule 23(c)(4) to certify a class 
of debtors seeking injunctive relief, leaving the issue of damages to be re-
solved separately.273 
                                                          
when no common formula for calculating damages exists), and In re Motor Fuel Temperature 
Sales Practices Litig., 292 F.R.D. 652, 676 (D. Kan. 2013) (certifying a class as to liability only); 
see also Jacob v. Duane Reade, Inc., 293 F.R.D. 578, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (collecting cases). 
 267.  See, e.g., Leyva, 716 F.3d at 514; In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 289 F.R.D. 555, 
582 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (characterizing Comcast as requiring that the methodology of proving dam-
ages must be tied to liability). 
 268.  716 F.3d at 514. 
 269.  Id.; see also Parra v. Bashas’, Inc., 291 F.R.D. 360, 393 (D. Ariz. 2013) (holding grocery 
store employees’ calculation of back pay met the predominance element because “through a com-
puter program, and relying on ‘objective factors’ . . . the plaintiffs will be able to calculate back 
pay losses for ‘each eligible class member’”).  In contrast, in Cowden v. Parker & Associates, 
Inc., the plaintiffs’ claims that the employer withheld commissions and charged excessive fees 
were found unsuitable for certification because “[p]laintiffs have offered no manageable way to 
calculate damages across the entire class and the individual damages calculations that would be 
required will inevitably overwhelm any questions common to the entire class.”  No. CIV.A. 5:09-
323-KKC, 2013 WL 2285163, at *7 (E.D. Ky. May 22, 2013). 
 270.  See, e.g., In re Motor Fuel, 292 F.R.D. at 676 (certifying the liability aspects of plaintiffs’ 
claims only); Miri v. Dillon, 292 F.R.D. 454, 456 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (same).  
 271.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4). 
 272.  See Jacob v. Duane Reade, Inc., 293 F.R.D. 578, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (collecting author-
ity).  The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari of two cases involving certification under Rule 
23(c)(4).  Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 
1277 (2014); In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838 (6th 
Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Whirlpool Corp. v. Glazer, 134. S. Ct. 1277 (2014).  Thus, the 
availability of Rule 23(c)(4) remains open for application by lower courts. 
 273.  In re Rodriguez, 695 F.3d 360, 369 n.13 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Rule 23(c)(4) explicitly recog-
nizes the flexibility that courts need in class certification by allowing certification with respect to 
particular issues and division of the class into subclasses.” (quoting Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 231 F.3d 970, 976 (5th Cir. 2000))). 
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Recent court decisions have changed the landscape of certification, but 
have not eliminated the need for relief from widespread lender noncompli-
ance in consumer bankruptcy cases.  Class actions can compensate affected 
debtors and serve as a valuable regulatory check on lender behavior.  More-
over, debtor class action claims appear well-suited to survive under modern 
certification standards.274  In light of the regulatory benefits of class litiga-
tion, as well as the role of bankruptcy courts in furthering consumer finan-
cial protection, debtors’ attorneys should embrace class-wide litigation in 
bankruptcy.  Courts should likewise apply the certification standards as lib-
erally as precedent permits. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Addressing lender overreaching in consumer bankruptcy cases is no 
easy task.  Despite the existence of clear legal and procedural rules, as well 
as the oversight of the bankruptcy judge, case trustee, and a variety of bank-
ruptcy professionals, large lenders persist in violating the bankruptcy law 
and debtors’ rights in consumer bankruptcy cases.  Debtor class actions, if 
used expansively, might provide a threat sufficient to alter lenders’ decision 
making, encouraging greater levels of compliance than currently exists.  
Looking forward, as class action precedent increasingly bars consumers 
from asserting small value claims outside of the bankruptcy arena, bank-
ruptcy could conceivably rise in prominence as a potential outlet for these 
consumer harms to be addressed.275 
Bankruptcy class actions are an attractive solution to the problems 
identified in this Article principally because they require no new institu-
tional resources or law reform measures to be effective.  As such, bankrupt-
cy attorneys, case trustees, and courts can embrace the debtor class action to 
encourage greater levels of compliance with bankruptcy and related con-
sumer protection law than currently exists.  Nevertheless, the debtor class 
action should not be pursued to the exclusion of other solutions.  In particu-
lar, the work of the United States Trustee Program, individual bankruptcy 
judges, and case trustees has been essential to bringing past lender and ser-
vicer misconduct to light.  This work should continue.  In addition, scholars 
and lawmakers should explore new law reform measures, including ad-
dressing the prudence of modern barriers to class actions and advancing 
non-class forms of private litigation, to further close consumer bankruptcy’s 
enforcement gap. 
                                                          
 274.  See Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute Reso-
lution, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 511, 532 (2013) (“[S]everal indicia suggest that class actions are alive, 
well, and thriving as usual, if, in some quarters, in somewhat modified forms.”). 
 275.  This will be discussed in a forthcoming piece.  See Bruce, supra note 27. 
